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Yusuf Enes Sezgin: Islamic Liberation Theology in South Africa: Farid Esack’s Religio-Political 
Thought 
(Under the direction of Cemil Aydin) 
In this thesis, through analyzing the religiopolitical ideas of Farid Esack, I explore the 
local and global historical factors that made possible the emergence of Islamic liberation 
theology in South Africa. The study reveals how Esack defined and improved Islamic liberation 
theology in the South African context, how he converged with and diverged from the mainstream 
transnational Muslim political thought of the time, and how he engaged with Christian liberation 
theology. I argue that locating Islamic liberation theology within the debate on transnational 
Islamism of the 1970s onwards helps to explore the often-overlooked internal diversity of 
contemporary Muslim political thought. Moreover, it might provide important insights into the 
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On September 13, 1986, a young Muslim theologian and anti-apartheid activist, Farid 
Esack, took the stage in the Central Methodist Church of Johannesburg to deliver the Second 
Desmond Tutu Peace Lecture amid the chaotic atmosphere dominating South Africa under the 
apartheid regime. The lecture was organized by the South African Chapter of the World 
Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), an international interfaith organization dedicated to 
the promotion of justice and peace through religious dialogue and solidarity. Farid Esack was 
among leading representatives of different religious faith communities of South Africa who 
contributed substantially to the struggle against apartheid. He served between the years of 1984 
and 1990 as the national coordinator of the Call of Islam, a prominent Muslim anti-apartheid 
organization, and also worked for the WCRP as Vice President for a number of years.  
Esack began by expressing his pleasure at talking as a member of the South African Muslim 
community, which had “come home to take its rightful place alongside other communities in the 
struggle against dehumanization and for justice and peace.”1 His main focus was not on anti-
apartheid struggle, however. Instead, he underlined the necessity of developing a comprehensive 
notion of justice that would go beyond the political realm. This could be possible, Esack pointed 
out, as long as his hearers were aware of the oneness of humanity and cared about universal 
concerns. For example, the liberation of women from the yoke of patriarchy and gender-based 
 
1 Esack, “The Unfinished Business of Our Liberation Struggle,” Farid Esack’s Personal Website (Outdated), 
September 13, 1986, http://www.oocities.org/faridesack/fedesmondtutulecture.html. 
2 
oppression had to be an essential part of the struggle for justice. Also, human beings had to pay 
attention to environmental issues and attempt to prevent the exploitation of natural resources. 
Last but not least, faith communities had to build trust, and act with solidarity and shared 
responsibility within an active struggle for justice. “Only in struggling together,” stated Esack, 
“will we be able to discover in our neighbors of other religions virtues like peace, justice, love, 
forgiveness and hope.”2 
The anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s led Esack to formulate an Islamic theology of 
liberation through interpreting the Qur’an as a liberating text. He was interested in revealing the 
revolutionary potential of Islam and developing a radical religiopolitical thought centered on 
justice, liberation, and pluralism. He believed that the Qur’an urged Muslims to struggle against 
social injustices such as racism, patriarchy, and economic deprivation. Moreover, interfaith 
solidarity was one of the building blocks of his theology. Not only co-religionists, but everyone 
who committed to creating and securing a just sociopolitical system would be comrades of 
Muslims in their pursuit of justice. This theological perspective was remarkable in a period in 
which both academic and public discussions concerning the relationship between Islam and 
politics focused on the topic of Islamism. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, scholars and 
other observers have increasingly described Islamism as a rising radical political ideology that 
aims to establish an Islamic system of governance based on sharia law and Islamic moral codes. 
A thirst for political power in the form of a state and the goal of creating an “ideological 
community” has been usually the defining feature of Islamist movements since then.3 
 
2 Esack, “Our Liberation Struggle.” 
 




By the 1990s, however, some scholars such as Olivier Roy and Asef Bayat surprisingly 
asserted that Islamism had failed completely as a political project, for Islamists did not succeed 
in their attempts to put into practice their ideology.4 Yet, the idea that Islamism is a fundamental 
political threat to the very existence of the Western world, symbolized by the notion of “the clash 
of civilizations,” became the hallmark of the debate on Islamist politics, particularly in the post-
Cold War and the post-9/11 contexts.5 This prevailing perception of Islamism as a political 
threat, usually called “Islamic fundamentalism,” emerged also in parallel with a dramatic shift in 
Islamist politics and thought itself that began in the late 1970s. In fact, Islamism rose in the 
1970s by appealing to Muslim masses disappointed with the failure of post-colonial nationalism, 
socialism and liberalism in bringing about justice and equality to the world.6 It was not only an 
outcry against the authoritarian secular leaders ruling Muslim-majority countries as well as 
against the Western (neo)colonial powers but also a demand for social justice and liberation. The 
famous Islamist slogan, “Neither East nor West but only Islam!” was very much indicative of 
both the disappointment and the hope Muslims had at the time.  
Since the 1980s, however, due to some profound regional and global developments, 
Islamists departed considerably from the language of social justice and increasingly adopted 
socio-politically conservative and authoritarian attitudes. After the revolution of 1979, the 
liberative spirit of Iranian masses was substantially absorbed into an authoritarian rule in the face 
of American threats and the Iran-Iraq War. The rise of Iran as a global force exporting the 
 
4 For the debate on the failure of Islamism, see Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (London: Tauris, 1994) and 
Bayat, “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 9 (1996): 43-52. 
5 See Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49. 
6 It is significant to note that, in the same period, “human rights emerged historically as the last utopia,” as a result of 
the collapse of both cold war and postcolonial ideologies. See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in 
History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
4 
revolutionary Islamic discourse to Muslim communities around the world had alarmed Saudi 
Arabia to challenge Iran’s growing popularity and political power. The Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 presented the Saudi with a golden opportunity to increase its regional power 
as well as exert greater control over Sunni movements by establishing transnational networks of 
Muslim militants and providing financial assistance to the Afghan mujahideen. Consequently, 
conflicting geopolitical strategies of Iran and Saudi Arabia as the two most influential Muslim-
majority countries limited Islamist politics mostly to the political interests of these religious 
nation-states. 
One major consequence of that shift was the withdrawal of Islamism into its own shell. In 
Muslim communities, the upsurge of anti-Americanism prompted by the Iranian Revolution as 
well as the Camp David Accords of 1978 was accompanied by the growth of anti-Soviet 
sentiment due to the invasion of Afghanistan.7 As Cemil Aydin pointed out, those contingent 
political developments gave rise to the “geopolitical pan-Islamic revival” in the 1980s and the 
idea of the political unification of Muslims around the world became the hallmark of Islamist 
politics.8 This was a radical departure from the earlier forms of international solidarity that many 
Islamists had actively practiced together with various subaltern groups including postcolonial 
nationalists, socialists, pan-Asianists and pan-Africanists. Pan-Islamists of the 1980s embraced 
the “racialized” Muslim identity and built their political vision on the binary of Muslims vs. non-
 
7 The negotiations and the subsequent agreements signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, under the guidance of the US, was a source of huge disappointment on 
the part of Muslim masses with Egypt for it had abandoned the Palestinian cause, and also with non-Muslim 
countries who had not opposed the US-led plan: Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual 
History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 211-15. 
 
8 Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, 177. 
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Muslims.9 Therefore, “the persistent illusion of an insular Muslim world” damaged Islamist 
internationalism severely and relegated “Muslims to reactionary and parochial positions, often 
against Western claims to universality.”10 As a result, embracing the idea of an Islamic state, 
considering global Muslim solidarity as the only way to achieve liberation, empowering Muslim 
communities, even to the detriment of others, and protecting the geopolitical interests of Muslim 
nation states constituted substantially the main agenda of Islamist thought and politics. 
In the light of the transformation that Islamism went through from the late 1970s on, 
scholars have often ignored that, since the late 19th century, many pioneers of contemporary 
Islamism were greatly interested and directly invested in the issues of anti-colonialism, anti-
imperialism, freedom and social justice; and not only political but also theological, 
philosophical, ethical and socioeconomic concerns were at the top of their intellectual agendas.  
They often engaged critically and constructively with secular ideologies including liberalism, 
socialism, and Marxism in search for liberationist political projects and interacted dynamically 
with anticolonial revolutionaries around the world for freedom and independence. In other 
words, Islamism has had a rich history of emancipatory politics and thought, from the solidarity 
between anticolonial Islamists and socialists in British India to the intellectual interaction 
between Muslim and Marxist intellectuals of the Third World.11 
 
9 Muslimness was racialized by European empires in the 19th century on the basis of the prevailing notion that 
Muslims were racially inferior to (Christian) Europeans. In the late 19th century, the first generation of Pan-Islamists 
relied on the same racialized Muslim identity as an effective tool in fostering global unity of Muslims in order to 
challenge the political domination of the West. See Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, 3. 
 
10 Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, 226. 
 
11 For an excellent analysis of the commonalities and interaction between nationalism, socialism, and Islamism in 
the first half of the 20th century, see Maia Ramnath, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global 
Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
Ammar Ali Jan, in his remarkable piece on communism and Islamism in colonial India, criticized the ones who have 
seen the relationship between those ideologies in terms of overlapping geopolitical interests. He underlined, instead, 
their “shared historical subjectivity that allow these two political currents to recurrently overlap throughout the 
twentieth century.” See Jan, “Islam, Communism and the Search for a Fiction,” in Muslims Against the Muslim 
6 
Islamic liberation theology is no exception to this negligence. Scholars have not given 
enough attention to the emergence of Islamic liberation theology in the 1980s, although it was 
quite notable in the face of rising authoritarian, state-based and parochial tendencies within the 
mainstream Islamism in the same period.12 As a radical theology that attempted to read and 
 
League (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 255-284. Faridah Zaman, in her significant article on 
Indian Pan-Islamism in early twentieth century British India, challenged the notion of a “homogeneous” Pan-
Islamism and pointed to the diversity of Indian Pan-Islamist thought that had included democratic, republican, and 
socialist ideas. See Zaman, “The Future of Islam, 1672–1924,” Modern Intellectual History (2018): 1-31. For the 
revolutionary mindset and political role Indian Muslims had during the Indian anticolonial struggle, see also Faridah 
Zaman, “Revolutionary History and the Post-Colonial Muslim: Re-Writing the ‘Silk Letters Conspiracy’ of 
1916,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 39, no. 3 (2016): 626-643. Syed Akbar Hyder showed, in his 
fascinating study on the narrative of Karbala and martyrdom in South Asian memory, that Indian Muslims 
contributed to the struggle of the colonized masses as well as to the language of secular ideologies with their 
religious symbols. See Hyder, Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). For a study that drew attention to Indian Muslim intellectuals, such as Mushir Hussain Kidwai (1878-
1937), who had tried to formulate “ethical forms of political economy” based on Islamic teachings through 
benefitting from socialist ideologies, see Julia Stephens, Governing Islam: Law, Empire, and Secularism in Modern 
South Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 157. Samee Siddiqui argued, in his comprehensive 
study on Muhammad Barkatullah (1864-1927), a prominent Muslim intellectual-activist from India, that Barkatullah 
became a revolutionary anticolonialist with commitment to his Muslim identity and conceptualized a “cosmopolitan, 
inclusive and egalitarian” pan-Islamism. See Siddiqui, “The Career of Muhammad Barkatullah (1864-1927): From 
Intellectual to Anticolonial Revolutionary” (Master’s Thesis, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2017). 
For a comparative study on the different anti-colonial perspectives of leading pan-Islamists of the late 19th-early 20th 
century, see Umar Ryad, “Anti-Imperialism and the Pan-Islamic Movement,” in Islam and the European Empires, 
ed. David Motadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 131-49. For a study on the complex relationship 
between Islamism and anti-imperialism, see Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Empire: The Incongruous Nature of Islamist 
Anti-Imperialism,” Socialist Register 44 (2008): 38-54. For an insightful comparative study on the ideas of Ali 
Shariati and Frantz Fanon that explored the global aspect of Shariati’s views by situating him within anticolonial 
political thought, see Arash Davari, “A Return to Which Self? Ali Shari’ati and Frantz Fanon on the Political Ethics 
of Insurrectionary Violence,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 34, no. 1 (2014): 86-
105. See the letter sent by Fanon to Shariati in 1961, in which the former acknowledged the potential force of Islam 
in creating an anti-western civilization centered on human emancipation: See Frantz Fanon, “Letter to Ali Shariati,” 
in Frantz Fanon: Alienation and Freedom, eds. Jean Khalfa and Robert J.C. Young (Bloomsbury: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2018), 667-669. For a significant study on Malek Bennabi, the prominent Algerian intellectual known 
for his Third Worldist ideas, his conception of “colonisibility,” and his leading role in Algerian Islamism, see Phillip 
C. Naylor, “The Formative Influence of French Colonialism on the Life and Thought of Malek Bennabi,” French 
Colonial History 7, (2006). Jeffrey J. Byrne, also, mentioned Bennabi as an example of how the Third Worldist 
moment after the Bandung Conference gave rise to feelings of enthusiasm and hope and led many Algerians to think 
of Third Worldism as a promising alternative political project. See Jeffrey J. Byrne, Mecca of Revolution. Algeria, 
Decolonization, and the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
 
12 The alternative theologies were not limited to theologies of liberation. There have emerged various untraditional 
interpretive approaches, particularly in the second of half of the last century, that introduced the issues of justice, 
gender, freedom, and human rights into Qur’anic studies. See, for example, Massimo Campanini, The Qur'ān: 
Modern Muslim Interpretations, trans. Caroline Higgitt (New York: Routledge, 2011); Dina El Omari, Juliane 
Hammer and Mouhanad Khorchide, eds., Muslim Women and Gender Justice: Concepts, Sources, and Histories 
(New York: Routledge, 2020); and Aysha A. Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qur’an (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
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practice the Muslim faith from the perspective of the poor and the oppressed and with the aim of 
eliminating systematically imposed economic, social and political injustices, Islamic liberation 
theology clearly contradicted, in many ways, the Islamism of the 1980s. Yet, their parallel 
developmental processes should also reveal to what extent they were connected. In this regard, a 
detailed analysis of the religiopolitical ideas of Farid Esack as a Muslim liberation theologian 
enables us to understand how he defined and improved Islamic liberation theology in the South 
African context, how he converged with and diverged from the mainstream transnational Muslim 
political thought of the time, and how he engaged with Christian liberation theology.13 I argue 
that locating Islamic liberation theology within the debate on transnational Islamism of the 1970s 
onwards helps to explore the often-overlooked internal diversity of contemporary Muslim 
political thought. Moreover, it might provide important insights into the possible continuities 
between the emancipatory Muslim thought of the pre-1980s and Islamic liberation theology. 
There are two important intellectuals, besides Esack, who were deeply invested in 
constructing an Islamic theology of liberation.14 Asghar Ali Engineer (1939-2013), an Indian 
Muslim intellectual-activist, started to think about the possibilities of crafting a liberative 
 
13 Liberation theology is originally a Christian theology that became popular in Latin America during the 1970s and 
1980s. It is an unorthodox reinterpretation of Catholicism that pays attention to the issues of systemic poverty, 
exploitation, oppression and injustice. According to liberation theologians, Christianity aims at liberating people 
from all personal and structural bonds and, therefore, calls for an active struggle for justice in solidarity with the 
oppressed. For more on the history of the concept and the liberation theology movement, see Christian Smith, The 
Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991). For a recent study that sees liberation theology as a “trans-American intellectual movement,” see 
Lilian Calles Barger, The World Come of Age: An Intellectual History of Liberation Theology ((New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2018). 
 
14 Shabbir Akhtar is another scholar who used the term in his studies. I do not include him in this work because, 
apart from appropriating the term Islamic liberation theology, he did not present a clear conceptualization and not 
elaborate on the idea of liberative theology. See Shabbir Akhtar, The Final Imperative: An Islamic Theology of 
Liberation (London: Bellew Pub., 1991). 
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theology in the early 1980s.15 As a member of both India’s Muslim minority and a minority 
group within the Indian Muslim community, Engineer was struggling against the communal and 
ethnic violence taking place in India as well as challenging the religious hierarchy and the 
economic corruption of his community.16 He tried to demonstrate that the history of Muslims 
included rational and progressive theologies and looked into the Qur’an to discover the basis of a 
theology predicated on the values of freedom, equality, peace and distributive justice.17 In close 
dialogue with Marxist literature, he criticized theologies of “status quo” and preached resistance 
to any kind of exploitation and oppression. Until his death in 2013, Engineer continued to write 
and speak extensively on the issues of South Asian Islam, religious minorities, intercommunal 
harmony and peace, gender justice, state, secularism and non-violence.18 
 
15 Since the late 1970s, Engineer published some newspaper articles discussing Islamo-Marxist organizations in 
Iran: Engineer, “Another Showdown?” Economic and Political Weekly 4, no. 14 (1979): 655-56; Engineer, “A New 
Interpretation of Islam,” Economic and Political Weekly 15, no. 40 (1980): 1654-55. But his first comprehensive 
study on Islamic liberation theology was the book he published in 1984. See Engineer, ed., Islam and Revolution 
(Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1984). Two of his articles in the book provided a detailed analysis of both the 
“fundamentalist” and “revolutionary” trends in the history of Islam as well as in the contemporary Muslim 
communities: “Islamic Fundamentalism and the Muslim World” and “On Developing Liberation Theology in 
Islam.” See also Engineer, Islam and Liberation Theology: Essays on Liberative Elements in Islam (Pakistan: Kitab 
Ghar, 1991). 
 
16 Engineer was affiliated with the Dawoodi Bohras, a group within the Ismaili branch of Shiism. As a result of his 
increasing discontent with the leadership and policies of the group, he left it and, then, spearheaded the foundation 
of the Progressive Dawoodi Bohra in the second half of the 1970s. 
 
17 For a detailed and critical account of Engineer’s theology, see Shadaab Rahemtulla, “From the Hereafter to the 
Here and Now: The Reading of Asghar Ali Engineer,” in Qur’an of the Oppressed: Liberation Theology and 
Gender Justice in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
 
18 Some of Asghar Ali Engineer’s most seminal works: Engineer, Islam: Gender Justice: Muslims Gender 
Discrimination (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2013); Engineer, The Prophet of Non-violence: Spirit of 
Peace, Compassion & Universality in Islam (New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing, 2011); Engineer, ed., The Role of 
Minorities in Freedom Struggle (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1986); Engineer, Rational Approach to Islam (New 
Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2001); and Engineer, On Developing Theology of Peace in Islam (New Delhi: 
Sterling Publishers, 2005). 
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The Iranian-American scholar Hamid Dabashi (b. 1951) also contributed considerably to 
the development of the idea of an Islamic theology of liberation.19 Dabashi argued that both 
Islamism and Christian liberation theology should be considered as religious traditions of 
“rebellion” and “resistance” against capitalist modernity. Being anticolonial forces, they also 
engaged with socialist and nationalist ideologies. However, according to Dabashi, the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an era in which the 
civilizational conflict between the West and Islam came to an end since both the Western world 
and Islamic ideology had evaporated with their failures.20 Considering the post-civilizational era 
with the US being the only global power, Dabashi underlined the necessity of formulating a new 
Islamic theology of liberation that would introduce a global perspective and discourse and 
embrace “its ideological rivals and theological alternatives” to ensure a cross-cultural dialogue 
against the global empire.21 
Although both Engineer’s and Dabashi’s perspectives on the issue of Islamic liberation 
theology are remarkable and valuable, there are a number of reasons why I preferred focusing on 
Farid Esack in my study. First of all, unlike Engineer and Dabashi, Esack spent many years as an 
 
19 Dabashi, renowned for his works on postcolonialism, Iranian history and culture, modern Islam, and comparative 
literature, is currently a professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, New York. 
His most important work on Islamic liberation theology: Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the 
Empire (New York: Routledge, 2008).  
 
20 According to Dabashi, the Islamic Revolution in Iran had revealed the fundamental paradox of Islam as a religion 
of protest: “It morally succeeds precisely at the moment of its political failure” and “it morally fails at the moment 
of its political success”: Dabashi, Resisting the Empire, 17. 
 
21 Dabashi named that nascent form of liberation theology as liberation theodicy: “The difference between a 
liberation theology and a liberation theodicy is,” according to Dabashi, “the difference between an emancipatory 
movement in categorical isolation from the rest of the world and one integral to the global collapse of all binary 
oppositions.” See Dabashi, “Liberation Theodicy,” in Resisting the Empire, 196-233. Dabashi also argued that the 
revolutionary legacy of Malcolm X (1925-1965) had the very potential for laying the foundations for the Islamic 
liberation theodicy since “in the revolutionary character of Malcolm X is gathered the most critical link necessary 
between the alienated colonial corners of capitalist modernity and the disenfranchised communities in its 
metropolitan center.” See Dabashi, “Malcolm X as a Muslim revolutionary,” in Resisting the Empire, 234-253. 
 
10 
activist in different Islamist organizations and, in the process, developed a critical and 
constructive engagement with Islamist thought.22 Secondly, Esack is a trained scholar of 
Qur’anic studies who received madrasa education but, at the same time, became quite critical of 
the very same traditional teachings that had informed his theological background. Thirdly, as 
early as the mid-1970s, he met religious organizations that had been influenced by Christian 
liberation theology. Furthermore, as a veteran of anti-apartheid struggle, he came to know 
various ideologies such as Black Consciousness, African nationalism, and socialism as well as 
assumed a leading role in interfaith struggle against apartheid during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Lastly, he is a prolific Muslim intellectual who has been thinking and writing for almost 40 years 
on Islamic liberation theology and many other pertinent issues. Given this unique personal 
history, Esack’s religiopolitical thought has been surprisingly understudied and underanalyzed. 
Of just a few significant works on theology of liberation in Islam as well as Esack, 
Shadaab Rahemtulla’s book Qur’an of the Oppressed is the most comprehensive study ever 
undertaken.23 Rahemtulla examined comparatively four liberationist and gender justice-based 
Qur’anic commentaries including those of Esack and Engineer.24 He argued that all the 
commentaries underlined justice as the core attribute of both God and Muslim scripture and 
criticized the existing interpretations for establishing non-egalitarian and exclusive perspectives. 
They also made the Qur’an speak to various contexts of oppression through new reading 
 
22 I should note here that although Esack deeply engaged with the liberative ideas of Shia intellectuals such as Ali 
Shariati, he has spoken largely from within the Sunni tradition, whereas the Shia tradition is more dominant in the 
theologies of liberation constructed by Engineer and Dabashi. 
 
23 Rahemtulla, Qur’an of the Oppressed: Liberation Theology and Gender Justice in Islam (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
 
24 The African American theologian Amina Wadud (b. 1952) and the Pakistani-American scholar Asma Barlas (b. 
1950) are the other two theologians Rahemtulla included in his study.  
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strategies they developed.25 Besides emphasizing the importance of “the immediate present” in 
Esack’s and Engineer’s hermeneutical efforts, Rahemtulla also pointed to the role of the notion 
of tawhid in all the four commentaries.26 Moreover, he paid particular attention to some parallels 
between Islamist thought and Esack’s theology of liberation. According Rahemtulla, both 
approaches were similar in that they read scripture mostly through the immediate context, laid 
stress on the importance of practice alongside faith, and aimed to bring the Qur’an and ordinary 
Muslims together by ignoring the Muslim clergy.27  
Matthew Palombo’s work that examined the intellectual roots of Islamic liberation 
theology in South Africa is also striking for its emphasis on Islamism.28 According to Palombo, 
alongside different ideologies rooted in African humanism such as Gandhian satyagraha, Black 
Consciousness, and Pan-Africanism, Islamist thought was also very influential in shaping the 
minds of Muslim activists including Esack. That the two traditions had converged in the anti-
apartheid struggle laid the groundwork for the birth of Islamic liberation theology as a lay, 
critical, and praxis-based theology. The political role of Islam was therefore not understood as 
“state building or power grabbing,” but as “living out faith as political praxis for liberation and 
seeing Islam as a comprehensive way of life.”29 Halil Yenigun also argued that, in contrast to the 
politics of Islamism, Islamist discourse included some elements resembling Christian liberation 
 
25 The main reading practices adopted and improved by those figures were praxis-based reflection, historical 
criticism, textual holism, and careful literary analysis: Rahemtulla, Qur’an of the Oppressed, 4. 
 
26 Rahemtulla believed that Wadud, Barlas, and Esack echoed the Iranian revolutionary-intellectual Ali Shariati’s 
(1933-1977) conception of tawhid. I will discuss below the impact of Shariati’s ideas on Esack’s thought. 
 
27 Though similar parallels might be drawn by Rahemtulla between Islamists and the other three scholars as well, he 
particularly focused on the case of Esack probably because of Esack’s history of Islamist activism. 
 
28 Matthew Palombo, “The Emergence of Islamic Liberation Theology in South Africa,” Journal of Religion in 
Africa 44, no. 1 (2014): 28-61. 
 
29 Palombo, “Islamic Liberation Theology in South Africa,” 51. 
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theology. In that regard, even Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) could be considered, in certain moments, 
as a Muslim liberation theologian with “his strong emphasis on anti-imperialism and social 
justice resting upon a God-centric ontology.”30 Yenigun also appreciated Esack’s and Dabashi’s 
efforts to improve reformist and emancipatory moments of Islamism instead of adopting Western 
liberalism and secularism, and saw those efforts as the advanced steps of the modern islah 
(reform) tradition of Islam, which goes back to the Muslim activist-intellectual Jamaladdin 
Afghani (1838-1897). 
Suleyman Güder’s study that described liberation theology primarily as an attempt to 
return to the authentic nature of religion is the first comprehensive analysis of Christian and 
Islamic liberation theologies in the literature.31 Güder argued that both Christian and Muslim 
liberation theologians converged on three important points in their reinterpretative efforts: the 
significance of the context, the role of social justice concerns, and the necessity of critical 
approach. Those are also the criteria used by Güder to decide which Muslim intellectual could be 
considered liberation theologian.32 In other words, Güder did not differentiate Islamism from 
Islamic liberation theology, but gathered all the figures who shared the mentioned characteristics 
 
30 Yenigun, “The Political Ontology of Islamic Democracy: An Ontological Narrative of Contemporary Muslim 
Political Thought” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2013), 257. Yenigun also underscored the fundamentalist 
elements of Qutb’s thought and reached the conclusion that he was in fact oscillating between liberation theology 
and fundamentalism, 201. 
 
31 Güder, “Hıristiyan ve İslami Kurtuluş Teologlarının Öze Dönüş Mücadelesi: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz [The 
Quest of the Muslim and Christian Liberation Theologians to Return to the Authentic Self: A Comparative 
Analysis]” (PhD diss., Yildiz Technical University, 2016). There are actually a few other studies comparing 
Catholic and Islamic liberation theologies but they either focused on only prominent intellectuals or examined solely 
general shared characteristics and themes. In other words, they did not extend the scope of their comparison to 
emancipatory Islamism in general. For example, see Marco Demichelis, “Islamic Liberation Theology. An Inter-
Religious Reflection between Gustavo Gutierrez, Farīd Esack and Ḥamīd Dabāšī,” Oriente Moderno 94, no. 1 
(2014): 125-47; Mehmet Ciftci, “Liberation Theology: A Comparative Study of Christian and Islamic Approaches,” 
New Blackfriars 96, no. 1064 (2015): 489-506. 
 
32 He included Qutb, Shariati, Engineer, Esack, Dabashi, and Akhtar in the group of Muslim liberation theologians. 
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under the name of the latter. Yet, as Güder pointed out, since reform-minded Muslim 
intellectuals were not tied together by a religious institution like the Catholic Church, it is not 
possible to talk about a well-defined tradition of Islamic liberation theology whose members 
were in dialogue with each other.  
On the other hand, Asef Bayat drew a clear line between Islamism and Christian 
liberation theology and asserted that Islamism has never been able to give birth to a theology of 
liberation.33 One of the major differences between both traditions, according to Bayat, is their 
points of departure. Islamists aimed to build an Islamic sociopolitical regime whereas the main 
goal of liberation theologians was to liberate the poor and the oppressed. More importantly, 
Islamism was an “expression of cultural identity” manifesting itself against the domination of 
Western modernity whereas liberation theology waged a struggle for social justice against 
capitalist exploitation. Unlike the Islamist goal of re-Islamization of society, Christian liberation 
theologians tended to engage more with secular and humanist ideologies in imagining the future 
of sociopolitical system. In a similar vein, Siavash Saffari pointed to the dissimilarities between 
Shi’i Islamism and Shi’i liberation theology in pre-revolutionary Iran.34 Although both Islamists 
and liberation theologians were anti-imperialist, against authoritarianism, and willing to 
cooperate with the religious masses in Iran, they significantly diverged from each other. For 
example, like Bayat, Saffari also saw the main distinction between the two in terms of their 
 
33 See Bayat, “Not a Theology of Liberation,” in Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab 
Spring (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017), 69-91. 
 
34 Saffari, “Two Pro-Mostazafin Discourses in the 1979 Iranian Revolution,” Contemporary Islam 11, no. 3 (2017): 
287-301. According to Saffari’s classification, Mohammad Nakhshab (1923-1976), Ali Shariati, and Mahmood 
Taleqani (1911-1979) were part of the liberation theology camp whereas Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), 
Mohammad Beheshti (1928-1981), and Morteza Motahhari (1919-1979) were Islamists. According to Ibrahim M. 
Abu-Rabi', another prominent Shia scholar, Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010), was also a liberation 
theologian: “Toward an Islamic Liberation Theology: Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and the Principles of Shi'i 
Resurgence,” in Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press). 
14 
political projects, namely the creation of an Islamic state and that of a democratic one. 
Furthermore, Shi’i Islamists were mostly pro-clergy whereas liberation theologians were clearly 
anti-clergy. Last but not least, Islamists usually relied on conservative teachings as opposed to 
the critical and reformist approach of liberation theologians towards religious sources. 
I argue that the case of Farid Esack not only complicates the existing debate on Islamic 
liberation theology but also provides important insights into the points at which Islamist thought 
and liberation theology converged and diverged. As this thesis will elaborate, Esack’s 
religiopolitical thought took shape essentially within the context of the anti-apartheid struggle of 
the 1970s and 1980s. As an activist and trained theologian who had, from his early ages, closely 
interacted with different Muslim organizations influenced by the then rising transnational 
Islamism, Esack was a firsthand witness to and active participant in the many discussions around 
Islam and politics. He took a leading role in the development of progressive Islamism in South 
Africa in the 1980s and then developed the concept of Islamic liberation theology, in the 1990s, 
on the basis of the political praxis of the anti-apartheid Islamists. I seek to explain the 
intertwining of practice and theory in his theology and the way he related his thought to Islamist 
tradition to explore and understand the diverse forms that Islamism took. My main focus is 
therefore on Esack’s early career including his years in Pakistan, his role in the anti-apartheid 





 CHAPTER II 
FROM CAPE TOWN TO KARACHI: EARLY ENCOUNTERS OF ESACK 
 
“Every literary production is inescapably autobiographical” believes Esack and, in line with that, 
usually starts his speeches and writings by drawing a picture of his early life experience molded 
by South African apartheid of the 1960s and early 1970s and his religious education in Pakistan 
between the years 1974-1982.35 Esack was born in 1956, in Wynberg, a southern suburb of Cape 
Town. Then immediately came a challenging and traumatic life in which he grew up without a 
father, lost his mother at an early age and lived a life of poverty and racial discrimination. His 
family was one of the countless displaced communities that emerged from the Group Areas 
Act.36 In the early 1960s, they were forced to leave Wynberg and moved to Bonteheuwel, a 
shantytown reserved for “coloreds” in Cape Town, which Esack remembered as “absolute 
wasteland.”37 Esack’s mother was originally Malay whereas his father was originally Indian. As 
being part of the “colored” community, Esack experienced, at his early ages, a confusion of 
 
35 Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against 
Oppression (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997), 1. 
 
36 The Group Areas Act was legislated by the apartheid government in 1950 and implemented over time in order to 
form racially segregated settlements so that white superiority could be socially and economically reinforced. Most 
areas in Cape Town began to be zoned and segregated in 1961. See “Cape Town the Segregated City,” South 
African History Online, produced March 30, 2011; last updated August 27, 2019, 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/cape-town-segregated-city. 
 
37 Farid Esack, interview by Julie Frederikse, South African History Archive (SAHA), AL2460_A05.03.1, 
transcript, September 25, 1987, Harare, Zimbabwe, 2, 
http://www.saha.org.za/nonracialism/transcript_of_interview_with_farid_essack.htm. (This is a rare, in-depth 
interview that explored Esack’s politicization and ideological transformation from his childhood to the years of his 
anti-apartheid activism.) Esack’s years in Bonteheuwel would become the wellspring for his “theological quest and 
political engagement”: Charles Villa-Vicencio and Mills Soko, “Farid Esack: Muslim and Democrat,” in 
Conversations in Transition: Leading South African Voices (New Africa Books, 2012), 210. 
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identity for remaining in between the white and the black communities.38 He never met a black 
person until he was fourteen since coloured and black communities were living in separate 
neighborhoods. This was what apartheid meant for him: “to have people living on the other side 
of the road or the railway line or the hill.”39  
What essentially politicized the young Esack was, before apartheid, having to witness his 
mother’s painful life. Due to the ethnic tensions between Indian and Malay communities, 
Esack’s mother was disowned by her family after she got married to an Indian man. When her 
husband left her while Esack was a newborn baby, she was on her own to take care of six sons.40 
Esack’s childhood memories were shaped profoundly by the desperate poverty he and his family 
had to endure: “I’d often go to school barefeet… very often there was nothing to eat at our 
house, and a favourite was sugar and bread.”41 They were living in a two roomed house in a 
gang-ridden township where Esack’s mother was raped one night on her way to home from 
 
38 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 1. In other words, Esack was a member of a minority group among the oppressed 
“non-white” community. An anecdote he shared about the ambivalence surrounding the identity of the “colored” 
community was as follows: In 1962, “the king of Malesia (…) invited the Malays to come home to Malesia, and he 
offered to pay their expenses and so on in being repatriated to Malesia (…) They didn’t take the offer up, (…) it was 
much more because they were afraid of the unknown, rather than a clear statement that we are a part of South 
Africa, we are a part of the oppressed”: Esack, interview by Frederikse, 4. In the later years, Esack refused being 
identified with the “colored” community given that it was a racial category imposed by the apartheid regime. See 
Farid Esack, “Among the Quakers,” Journal of Woodbrooke College, no. 4 (Winter 1993/4): 19-26. 
 
39 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 3. See also Logan Cochrane and Waleed Chellan, “‘The Group Areas Act 
Affected Us All’: Apartheid and Socio-Religious Change in the Cape Town Muslim Community, South Africa,” 
Oral History Forum d’histoire orale (2017), Religious Individuals and Collective Identities: Special Issue on Oral 
History and Religion. 
 
40 This was the second time she was abandoned by a husband. Her first spouse had left her with three children 
before. Esack also would learn in 1982 that he had actually a sister from her mother’s relationship before her first 
marriage. However, considered a “socially unacceptable shame,” it had been kept in secret for decades. See Esack, 
Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, 5. Esack thus became very critical of the social gender norms that exclusively 
demonized and victimized women including her mother and has written extensively on gender issues. See especially 
Esack, “Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia,” in What Men Owe to Women: Men’s Voices from 
World Religions, eds. John C. Raines and Daniel C. Maguire (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2001). 
 
41 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 3.  
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work. Living through all the rigours of life for a “non-white” widow in apartheid South Africa, 
Esack’s mother had no choice but to work as an underpaid factory worker and also to take the 
burden of domestic responsibilities without anyone helping her.42 She passed away in 1971 when 
she was in her mid-fifties for her heart could not resist the overwork imposed upon her. In 
Esack’s words, she “succumbed to the triple oppression of women under apartheid: racism, 
capitalism, and patriarchy.”43 Being witness to his mother’s tragic life would make Esack pay 
particular attention to gender inequalities alongside other systemic injustices in the following 
years. 
Esack did not inherit a radical political culture from his family. He became politically 
active in the early 1970s, first, in a non-racial liberal student organization, the National Youth 
Action (NYA). In NYA, which was established in 1970 by “white schoolchildren of Cape 
Town,” white, black and “colored” high school students worked together against racial 
discrimination in education under the apartheid regime.44 Esack was happy to become part of a 
collective effort and thus to feel that “he was a somebody” now.45 He soon became the 
chairperson of the Bonteheuwel branch of NYA and detained in 1970, for the first time, for his 
political activism. In those years, Esack also came across the radical ideas the Black 
 
42 Retrospectively, Esack thought that one of the main reasons for his mother’s solitude was sexism. He and his 
brothers had taken no responsibility for household duties, for instance. See Esack, interview by Frederikse, 4. 
 
43 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, acknowledgements. Esack has mentioned her mother’s life story in 
several of his publications for the memory of her suffering has been so essential in his sensitivity to injustice and 
inequality. See esp. Farid Esack, “Lot and His Offer: 2016 IQSA Presidential Address,” Journal of the International 
Qur’anic Studies Association 2 (2017): 7-33. 
 
44 United Nations Centre against Apartheid, “World Against Apartheid,” Department of Political and Security 
Council Affairs (March 1971), https://www.aluka.org/stable/10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1971_09. 
 
45 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 9. 
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Consciousness Movement (BCM) propagated among “non-white” students.46 BCM’s critique of 
white liberalism and its call for the promotion of black identity as well as radical sociopolitical 
transformation had politicized the youth and attracted many of them to its ranks. Though Esack 
was initially reluctant to move to BCM, he soon came to realize that, despite the non-racial fabric 
of NYA, whites had been superior in the organization, and the rest, including himself, had been 
willing to become one of them: “In that particular era it wasn’t goodwill that made you reach out 
towards whites – it was much more your own sense of inferiority, your wanting to be in 
acceptable company, your wanting to be human, and whiteness representing that which is 
human.”47  
It comes no surprise that Esack analyzed later those years from a Fanonian perspective 
since Frantz Fanon’s writings were highly influential in shaping the Black Consciousness 
philosophy.48 Esack joined, in 1971, the South African Black Scholars’ Association (SABSA), 
the first organization that threw him into the middle of heavy ideological debates and radical 
anti-apartheid struggle.49 Barney Pityana, Henry Isaacs, Johnny Issel and Mosiuoa Lekota were 
some of the prominent figures within BCM whose speeches Esack had the opportunity to listen 
 
46 The BCM was a student movement that emerged in the late 1960s in parallel with the rise of the Black Power 
movement in the USA and then became influential in the 1970s when both the African National Congress and the 
Pan-Africanist Congress were banned. Soon after the active role it played in the Soweto Rebellion of 1976, the 
movement was suppressed by the South African state. See Robert Fatton, Black Consciousness in South Africa: The 
Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White Supremacy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986) 
and Daniel R. Magaziner, The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-1977 (Athens, 
OH: Ohio University Press, 2010). 
 
47 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 6. 
 
48 Fanon’s writings were highly influential in shaping the Black Consciousness philosophy and the ideas of its 
leader, Steve Biko. See Thomas K. Ranuga, “Frantz Fanon and Black Consciousness in Azania (South Africa),” 
Phylon (1960-) 47, no. 3 (1986): 182-91. 
 
49 SABSA was an extension of the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), which played a significant role in 
the BCM under the leadership of Steve Biko. 
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to.50 BC was the movement, Esack argued, that led the South African “non-white” to gain a 
sense of power, dignity, self-respect and self-confidence.51 But the major problem with the BC 
was their racism against non-black people including the “colored” which, according to Esack, 
could be understood in the context of apartheid though he preferred later, in the early 1980s, the 
non-racial and nationalist approach of the African National Congress (ANC) over the former.52 
Esack spent a year in SABSA and left the organization when he finished high school. He had a 
more colorful and seminal experience ahead: madrasa education in Pakistan. 
Esack was raised in a Muslim environment but did not face any family pressure to 
become a religious person. Nor did he inherit any Islamic political tradition from his community. 
He defined his early religious development as “essentially a personal thing.”53 He met the 
Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic global missionary movement, when he was nine years old. This was 
a turning point in his life journey, particularly in his future career as a Muslim religious leader. 
The Tablighi Jamaat was popular particularly among Indo-Pakistani Muslims of South Africa but 
it also extended its activities to other Muslim communities including the Malay, which Esack 
was part of.54 Being a non-political movement, The Tablighi Jamaat aimed to improve Muslim 
spirituality and morality by relying on traditional Islamic sources. The Jamaat’s focus on 
personal belief and rituals resulted in the detachment of its followers from daily social and 
 
50 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 10. 
 
51 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 7, 11. 
 
52 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 13-14. The nationalism of the ANC was not an ethnic nationalism. Its main focus 
was on the national unity and equal representation of all South African communities under a non-racist and 
democratic political regime. 
 
53 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 21. Given the lack of influential Islamic social and political movements in South 
Africa in the 1970s, it is not surprising that Esack had not grown up within a Muslim anti-apartheid tradition.  
54 See Brannon D. Ingram, Revival from Below: The Deoband Movement and Global Islam (Oakland, California: 
University of California Press, 2018). 
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political matters.55 Moreover, the movement was always very critical of the politicization of 
Muslim youth and of the Muslim minority who actively participated in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. Still, Esack maintained his relationship with the movement during his primary and 
secondary education while engaging in anti-apartheid political activities in non-Muslim 
organizations. In other words, he became a pious Muslim without any religiously motivated 
political consciousness while simultaneously became an “activist schooled in the black 
consciousness tradition of the early seventies.”56 Therefore, his early political and religious ideas 
developed independently of each other.  
The major product of Esack’s affiliation with the Tablighi Jamaat was his travel to 
Pakistan in 1974 to receive a traditional madrasa education with the scholarship he got from the 
organization.57 He spent eight years in Karachi completing the Dars-i Nizami, a comprehensive 
curriculum developed by an 18th century scholar, and specializing in Ulum al-Qur’an, the 
sciences of the Qur’an.58 He first studied at the Jami’a al-’Ulum al-Islamiyya between 1974-
1978 and then continued his religious training at the Jami’a ‘Alimiyya Islamiyya, where he got 
his Dars-i Nizami degree in 1980.59 Then he did some post-graduate work at the Jami’a Abi Bakr 
before his return to South Africa in 1982. These Islamic higher education institutions were 
 
55 Ebrahim Moosa, “Worlds ‘Apart’: The Tabligh Jamat under Apartheid 1963-1993,” Journal for Islamic Studies 
17 (1997): 28-48. 
 
56 Shamil Jeppie, “Amandla and Allahu Akbar Muslims and Resistance in South Africa, C. 1970-1987,” Journal for 
the Study of Religion 4, no. 1 (March 1991): 14. 
 
57 Esack explained his Pakistan journey as an exceptional event since the mostly Malay-origin Cape Muslims were 
traveling to Middle Eastern countries then, whereas Indo-Pak Muslims were choosing Pakistan or Afghanistan: 
Esack, interview by Frederikse, 22. 
 
58 Ingram, Revival from Below, 266n27. 
 
59 This degree was equal to a bachelor’s degree in Islamic Law and Theology: Villa-Vicencio and Soko, “Farid 
Esack: Muslim and Democrat,” 211. See also “Aims and Objectives of the Jamia,” accessed March 11, 2020, 
https://www.banuri.edu.pk/en/page/aims-and-objectives-of-the-jamia. 
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affiliated with the Deobandi tradition and giving a very strict, traditional religious training to 
Muslim students coming from all around the world. Esack would never forget the shock he felt 
when he began his education: “I was a psychological wreck in the beginning.” The shift from the 
dynamic socio-political atmosphere of South Africa to the onerous and didactic madrasa training 
was radical for him: “You are now stuck to your books… as if there is no world beyond your 
books and beyond your spiritual masters.”60 Moreover, most of the textbooks he had to study 
there were from at least six centuries ago and what was taught was a conservative theology that 
might pave the way for fundamentalist militant movements. While telling the story of those 
years, Esack usually reminds the audience that some of his classmates later became the founders 
of the Afghan Taliban.61 Esack’s anecdote seems intended to show the huge gap between the 
religious education he had in Pakistan and the fundamentally different theological perspective he 
developed since the early 1980s in South Africa.62 Surprisingly, the roots of his future 
theological orientation are also to be found in his Pakistan years. 
 In Pakistan, Esack became engaged with two other organizations that had shaped 
substantially his perception of religion. One was a classical Islamist organization influenced by 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Ittihad al-Tullab al-Muslimun, through which, Esack says, he learned 
to combine his religious and political commitments. That was an “evolution” for Esack since he 
“moved from seeing Islam and my [his] political involvement as two separate things” towards a 
 
60 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 23. 
 
61 Farid Esack, On Being a Muslim: Finding a Religious Path in the World Today, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
1999), 5. 
 
62 After 9/11 and the US’ global war on terror those Deobandi institutions were increasingly associated with the 
Taliban, however, as Ingram points out, the relationship between the Deoband movement and the Taliban “is only a 
thread of the larger fabric that makes up Deoband”: Ingram, Revival from Below, 2. 
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comprehensive understanding of Islam.63 The other was the Student Christian Movement (SCM), 
through which he engaged in social and educational works supporting the marginalized segments 
of the society.64 Esack’s first contact with the organization was made through an invitation by a 
Catholic priest to a reading group on the Croatian-Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich’s critical 
works on education.65 Then, he maintained his contact with SCM and attended many other 
meetings it organized. Esack was moved by the poor living conditions and religious 
discrimination that Christian and Hindu minorities of Pakistan faced just because he himself was 
a member of the Muslim “colored” minority in apartheid South Africa.66  
Esack also heard about Christian Liberation Theology for the first time through his 
involvement with SCM. He became impressed as he learned about the participation of the 
Christian clergy in liberation and social justice movements in different parts of the world from 
Latin America to the Philippines.67 More importantly, witnessing the story of the Pakistani 
Christians who “tried to making sense of living as Christians in a fundamentally unjust and 
exploitative society” made Esack think about his Muslimness through the lens of justice and 
liberation.68 He took active role in several social work projects of the SCM helping prisoners, 
 
63 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 24. 
 
64 The SCM in Pakistan was later called Breakthrough: Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, 5. The movement 
was part of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF), a global ecumenical organization, which cooperated 
with radical social movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. See Philip Potter and Thomas Wieser, Seeking and 
Serving the Truth: The First Hundred Years of the World Student Christian Federation (Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Council of Churches Publications, 1997). 
 
65 The priest who made the invitation was James “Jimmy” deSouza, an Indian Roman catholic priest known for his 
educational initiatives and humanitarian efforts: Esack, interview by Frederikse, 23. Ivan Illich was also a Catholic 
priest and famous for his critique of mass education and promotion of the idea of deschooling. 
 
66 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, 5. 
 
67 Esack, On Being a Muslim, 5. 
 
68 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, 5. 
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sweepers, and abandoned children, and thus came to comprehend the social dimensions of 
religion and the social responsibilities of believers. “Later,” says Esack, “I was to repeat all of 
the lessons of marrying belief and praxis in South Africa.”69 Indeed, from the social role of 
clergy in resisting oppression to the centrality of the sociopolitical context in understanding and 
practicing religion, he would effectively incorporate many key elements of Christian liberation 
theology into his notion of Islamic liberation theology that took shape within the anti-apartheid 
struggle.70 For example, one of the first works of Esack, The Struggle, which was published in 
1988 as a handbook for Muslim anti-apartheid activists, was largely based on what he learned 
from the struggle of the Pakistani Christians.71 
Another significant impact on Esack’s approach to Islam of his involvement with the 
Student Christian Movement was about the religious other and interfaith interaction. His 
Pakistan experience made Esack aware of “his,” in his own words, “chauvinistic Muslim mind” 
causing him to neglect the humanity and virtues of the religious other.72 The American Catholic 
educator Norman Wray (1923-2014) had a special place in Esack’s life, in that regard. Wray was 
a de La Salle Brother who, after working in the US, Sri Lanka, India and Guatemala, spent 
 
69 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, 5. 
 
70 As I discuss in Chapter 5, this was not a mere copy-pasting or imitation of what he had encountered in Christian 
liberation theology but a product of critical engagement, reinterpretation and authentic eclecticism. Also, Christian 
liberation theology was neither the only nor the main source of his theology, which had sprung predominantly from 
reformist and revolutionary traditions in Islam. 
 
71 The Struggle was published by the Call of Islam, an Islamist anti-apartheid movement, which I discuss in detail in 
Chapter 3 & 4. In the Introduction of the book, Esack underlines the role of his Pakistan experience in shaping his 
religious mindset: “The Struggle is the synthesis our group’s reflection on our involvement as Islamists in the 
struggle for justice in South Africa and that of other friends in the Indo-Pak subcontinent. Many of the ideas herein 
were born from my involvement with a group of … Christians in Pakistan. Their struggle to find an authentic and 
meaningful expression of their faith … first led me to a search for a relevant Islam.” Farid Esack, The Struggle (Salt 
River, Cape Town: Call of Islam, 1988). 
 
72 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 23. 
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almost half a decade in Pakistan serving in educational and social work projects.73 He was also 
one of the senior figures of SCM. Wray’s deep engagement with the marginalized of the 
Pakistani society was admirable and inspirational for Esack who saw in him the “essential 
goodness of people that transcends religious barriers.”74 They also worked closely when Esack, 
upon the invitation of Wray, taught Islamic studies at St. Patrick’s Technical High School in 
Karachi where Wray was the principal. Spending several years in Pakistan working together with 
Christian humanitarians, the question of how to approach the religious other from an Islamic 
point of view would become one of the fundamental issues Esack would deal with in detail in the 
following years. 
It is no doubt that many of Esack’s religiopolitical ideas that took shape and matured 
during the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s can be traced back to his Pakistan years. From his 
traditional madrasa training to his affiliation with an Islamist organization to his intimate 
relationship with the Pakistani Christians who struggled for social justice, the Pakistan journey 
had an enormous impact on both his formulation of an Islamic liberation theology and his 
determined critique of conservative Muslim theology and politics in South Africa.  
  
 
73 He helped setting up the St. Patrick’s Technical School and established a rehabilitation center for drug users in 
Karachi. See Rabia Ali, “For Sindh’s Drug Users, Chicago-Born Priest Built a ‘Village of Hope’,” The Express 
Tribune, August 19, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/424035/for-sindhs-drug-users-chicago-born-priest-built-a-
village-of-hope/. 
 
74 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 23. In one of his speeches, Esack expresses Wray’s value to him in these words: 
“My own humanity and Islam was salvaged through the engagement with Norman.”: Farid Esack, “Speaking about 





 CHAPTER III 
RISE OF ANTI-APARTHEID ISLAMISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
After eight years of having traditional religious education in Pakistan, Esack went back to South 
Africa in 1982 as a maulana, a madrasa-trained scholar.75 During the 1980s and early 1990s, he 
was addressed as “Maulana Farid Esack” on many occasions, as one of the religious leaders 
spearheading the Muslim anti-apartheid struggle, as a featured speaker in the poster of an 
interfaith gathering or as the author of a scholarly article.76 The title “maulana” did not only refer 
to his educational background but also acknowledged his status within (interfaith) anti-apartheid 
struggle as a respected Muslim religious leader. Moreover, being a member of the Muslim ulama 
had the advantage of addressing Muslim masses with an authoritative voice. It was therefore also 
a strategic asset that Esack could and, in fact, did use in persuading ordinary Muslims to 
participate in the struggle against the apartheid regime.77 Despite the fact that Esack was very 
critical of religious hierarchies and going to hold the belief that the ones who are the target of 
injustices should take the lead in liberation movement irrespective of any social or religious 
status, his religious title was with him during the struggle.78 Yet, it was not only about 
 
75 The “maulana” or “mawlana” is used, particularly in Indian communities, for respected Muslim leaders who have 
a formal madrasa degree. 
 
76 See for example Maulana Farid Esack, “Religion in the service of politics and service in the politics of religion,” 
World Faiths Encounter 4 (1993): 35-42. Though it seems that Esack is still addressed with that title on occasion, it 
is likely that the widespread use of the title was peculiar to the 1980s and early 90s when Esack was a popular 
community leader. 
 
77 In the following chapters, I will touch upon the issue of how he positioned himself as an untraditional and 
progressive clergyman and how he communicated ordinary Muslims. 
 
78 “Our authenticity is determined by our willingness to become of them [the poor and non-person] and by the 
struggle to be transformed by them even as we strive to transform them. Many of us in the contemporary Islamic 
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pragmatism. During the 1980s, Esack considerably balanced activism with intellectual 
production. As a theologian, he was heavily invested in finding ways of merging his religious 
belief and his commitment to social justice. He especially worked on the Qur’an to understand 
and interpret its message in a society suffering from enormous injustices, and thus started to set 
the cornerstones of his conception of Islamic liberation theology. In sum, as a leading Muslim 
activist-scholar, Esack drew an unusual portrait of maulana in apartheid South Africa. 
Upon his return to South Africa, Esack became the principal of a seminary in Natal where 
the students were mostly converted black Muslims. He was not content with the missionary 
pedagogy that dominated the institution because of the assumed hierarchical relationship 
between the already “enlightened” Muslim and the new convert that had to be educated.79 He 
resigned from his job after a year.80 On the other hand, as soon as coming back to the country, 
Esack took part in several religious and political organizations and got highly involved in 
interfaith as well as in Muslim anti-apartheid struggle. He first became a member of both the 
Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) and the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) and soon assumed 
important roles in both organizations. But the major organization Esack engaged in and devoted 
 
movement have done an enormous amount to shake the thrones of religious monopolists who appropriated Islam for 
their own unfulfilled lives and broken egos. … We cannot be a substitute for them [professional theologians]. The 
people must take responsibility for their religious lives. This ought to be the ideal that we must work towards.”: 
Farid Esack, “Mosques: The Battle for Control – Some Reflections,” Speech, Muslim Youth Movement Seminar, 
June 18, 1989, http://www.oocities.org/faridesack/femosques.html. 
 
79 His close dialogue with the Christian Pakistanis had not only changed his approach towards the religious other but 
also made him rethink of the issues of religious knowledge, practice and identity during his years of interfaith anti-
apartheid struggle. After many years, he would publish a critical article on the notion of dawah and missionary 
Islam in which he argued that dawah was basically a contemporary phenomenon that had become popular “as part 
of post-colonial contestation for Muslim territories.” See Esack, “Islamic Da’wah and Christian Mission: A Muslim 
Perspective,” in Christian-Muslim Encounter in Africa, ed. Karel T. August and Christof Sauer (Cape Town, South 
Africa: AcadSa Publishing, 2007), 21-29. 
 
80 That was also due to him having disagreements with the school management concerning his teaching methods 
informed by Ivan Illich’s critical pedagogy. But the main reason for his departure was the disagreement he had with 
the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) who ran the seminary. He left the MYM and then had to resign from the job 
since his ideological position was considered dangerous for students. See Esack, interview by Frederikse, 25. 
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his time and energy to was the Call of Islam, a progressive Islamist movement that he and his 
friends had founded in 1984 to fight against apartheid.81 Esack was the national coordinator of 
the Call between 1984 and 1990. Furthermore, as I discuss it below in detail, he can be 
considered as the theologian of the movement since he took a leading role in creating a new 
Islamist discourse and terminology around which the idea of Islamic liberation theology took 
shape. During the same period, he also became one of the prominent Muslim figures within both 
the United Democratic Front (UDF), the umbrella organization of the popular anti-apartheid 
movement formed in 1983, and the South African Chapter of the World Conference on Religion 
and Peace, a worldwide interfaith movement committed to make major religious traditions an 
instrument of peace, freedom, and justice.82  
The 1980s was the golden years of Muslim anti-apartheid activism as well as the 
grassroots anti-apartheid politics led by the UDF. After Imam Haron was murdered in 1969, 
there was undoubtedly a leadership vacuum in the South African Muslim community.83 Nor was 
 
81 The term “progressive Islamism” was used by Esack himself to describe the Call. I will explain in the next chapter 
why he used it to differentiate the distinctive approach of the movement from other Islamist organizations. 
 
82 World Conference on Religion and Peace Records, 1967-1995, DG 078, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, 
https://www.swarthmore.edu/Library/peace/DG051-099/DG078WCRP.html.  
 
83 Imam Abdullah Haron (1924-1969) was a much-respected religious leader and anti-apartheid activist from the 
Cape area. He was a symbolic figure in the South African Muslim community with his pioneering efforts to 
mobilize Muslims, particularly the youth, against the apartheid regime. He founded in 1958 the Claremont Muslim 
Youth Movement, a mosque-based organization that organized meetings and published declarations denouncing the 
unjust policies of the state. In his later years, Haron joined a banned and in-exile opposition movement, the Pan-
Africanist Congress. He was detained in 1969 for his involvement in the PAC and passed away in detention after 
being interrogated by the South African Security Branch for four months. More than 40,000 people attended his 
funeral and he became the role model for Muslim activists in the subsequent years. Though, in the same period, 
there were a number of leading (mostly Indian) Muslim anti-apartheid activists such as Yusuf Dadoo, Ismail Ahmed 
(Molvi) and Yusuf Cachalia, brothers; Amina Cachalia, Ahmed Kathrada, Dullah Omar and Fatima Meer, what had 
distinguished Haron from those figures was his insistence on the promotion of both an identifiable Muslim identity 
that was sensitive to injustice and oppression and a distinctively Muslim anti-apartheid discourse. In that regard, his 
path can be considered as a forerunner of anti-apartheid Islamism that emerged a decade later. See Barney Desai and 
Cardiff Marney, The Killing of the Imam (London: Quartet Books, 1978) and Ursula Günther, “The Memory of 
Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle,” Journal for the Study of Religion 17, 
no. 1 (2004): 117–50. 
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there an Islamic political organization that could mobilize Muslim masses in line with their 
sociopolitical concerns. During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of the Muslim youth enrolled at 
universities was on the rise. Those urbanized and educated young Muslims were in search of a 
new and comprehensive Islamic interpretation through which they could make sense of the 
prevailing conditions of apartheid South Africa as well as of the modern world. The traditional 
teachings of the ulama organizations and “apolitical” religious movements such as the Tablighi 
Jamaat and different Sufi groups were insufficient in addressing their questions.84 On top of that, 
the Muslim youth were deeply upset because of the silence of the Muslim clergy regarding Imam 
Haron’s death.85 The majority of the Muslim religious leaders had chosen to shut their eyes to 
the injustices of the apartheid regime while criticizing the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The 
critique of this double standard would be one of the fundamental pillars of the nascent anti-
apartheid Islamism.86 
The incapacity of existing Islamic organizations to deal with the sociopolitical reality 
faced by the South African Muslim youth was accompanied by two major historical moments, 
one local and the other global. The 1976 Soweto uprising and the 1980 school boycotts were 
 
84 Many Muslim anti-apartheid activists including Esack would argue that the religious organizations who had 
portrayed themselves as non-political were in fact consciously pursuing a political agenda designed not to confront 
the status quo and to exclusively protect the interests of the Muslim community. 
 
85 Esack was one of them. After many years, he would lambaste the fainthearted ulama while giving testimony in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Piet Meiring, “Faith in Reconciliation in South Africa: Insights from the 
South African Experience,” University of Otago Center for Theology and Public Issues, accessed August 5, 2019, 
https://www.otago.ac.nz/ctpi/otago106231.pdf, 6. 
 
86 Esack was interested in exposing the underlying theological thinking behind that hypocritical approach of the 
ulama organizations: “If it is us [Muslims] then we must invoke the verses relating to justice, opposition to tyranny 
and protest against human rights violations, but when it comes to others [non-Muslims] then it is a manifestation of 
Divine Wrath and something that they jolly well deserve: Esack, But Musa Went to Firaun!: A Compilation of 
Questions and Answers about the Role of Muslims in the South African Struggle for Liberation (Maitland, South 
Africa: Call of Islam, 1989), 16. 
29 
significant countrywide events that politicized “non-white” student masses in South Africa.87 
They also contributed to the radicalization of Muslim youth.88 Rashied Omar, one of the then 
influential Muslim anti-apartheid activists, was one of them: “I led the student protest at my 
school and got imprisoned. I was suspended from school, put on trial, and lost a whole year (...) 
As a result of this experience in 1976, I became much more committed as an anti-apartheid 
activist to struggle for peace and justice.”89 On the other hand, the rise of Islamist global 
networks and the dissemination of Islamist ideas all around the world during the 1970s had a 
considerable impact on the South African Muslim community too. In 1970, the Muslim Youth 
Movement (MYM) emerged as the main Islamist youth movement in South Africa and soon 
became “the first national Muslim organization” having several branches in Natal, Transvaal, 
and the Cape.90 It was followed by the Qiblah Mass Movement established shortly after the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979. These Islamists movements created a political language merged with 
Islamic principles that politicized and energized Muslim youth, and also led to various 
 
87 When, besides the very poor conditions of the education system provided to the “non-white” majority, the 
government made the Afrikaans language compulsory for “non-white” schooling in 1976, students went on strike 
and unsurprisingly encountered a quite violent response by the state. Then, the protests spread across the country 
like wildfire and an unprecedented resistance occurred against the apartheid rule. Similarly, students started class 
boycotts in reaction to the unfair apartheid education in 1980. Sylvia Vollenhoven, “South Africa at the Crossroads,” 
Third World Quarterly 8, no. 2 (1986): 486-506. 
 
88 Farid Esack, “Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 
(1988): 473-98. See also Inga Niehaus, “South Africa’s Muslims Between Participation and Exclusion – The 
Political Role of a Religious Minority During the Transition to Democracy,” in Proceedings of the International 
Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in Southern Africa, eds. Mahomed Haroon and Uleman Essop Dangor (Istanbul: 
IRCICA, 2009), 157-171. According to Niehaus, the increasing student mobilization brought about an immediate 
“necessity to respond to the socio-economic reality Muslims were confronted with in their communities, universities 
and their workplaces”, 159. 
 
89 Burcu Munyas, interview with A. Rashied Omar, Beyond Intractability, July 2005, 
https://www.beyondintractability.org/profile/a-rashied-omar. 
 
90 Abdulkader Tayob, “Islamism in South Africa,” Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center, July 25, 2018, 
https://mesbar.org/islamism-in-south-africa/. 
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discussions on the relationship between Islam and politics that would include Esack as an active 
participant.91  
The MYM was founded in Durban by “professionals and young businessmen.”92 Its chief 
concern was to promote “the Islamic way of life” in South Africa. It encouraged Muslims to read 
translations of Qur’an, strived to increase the agency of Muslim women in public sphere, 
particularly in mosques, and urged the ulama members to become publicly more accessible. 
Starting with the late 1970s, MYM considered Islam to be also an ideology and committed itself 
to the ideal of Islamization of society. It, therefore, gave priority to religious training and 
organizing youth. This was basically the effect of the MYM’s increasing interaction with 
overseas Islamist movements. In the same period, the MYM also started to denounce the 
apartheid rule more openly. Many MYM members participated in anti-government campaigns 
and protests in the period after the Soweto uprising. Al-Qalam, the official newspaper of the 
MYM, constituted an important part of the alternative media in South Africa and dedicated its 
efforts to uncovering state violence.93 Yet, the anti-apartheid struggle was not the main topic on 
MYM’s agenda until the late 1980s. Its primary goal was to develop a new Islamic 
understanding and practice that would pervade the whole South African society. It thus 
 
91 There were other, less influential, organizations that had been either directly established or substantially 
influenced by transnational Islamist actors. For instance, the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) started to 
organize nationally from the early 1970s on whereas the Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA) was founded in 
1975 under the guidance of Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (the Muslim World League) of Saudi Arabia. On the other 
hand, most members of al-Jihad (or al-Jihaad), a small but active anti-apartheid movement led by Ismail Joubert 
(known as Tatamkhulu Afrika after he became affiliated with the armed wing of the ANC in the early 1980s) 
converted into Shiism under the influence of the Iranian Revolution. 
 
92 See Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa Celebrating 40 Years of Activism (Durban: Muslim Youth 
Movement of South Africa, 2012), http://mym.za.org/images/downloads/40_year_print.pdf; and Abdulkader Tayob, 
Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town: UCT Press, 1995). 
 
93 See Muhammed Haron, “The Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam,” Islamic 
Studies 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 457-480. 
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challenged primarily the conservative ulama organizations, particularly in terms of Islamic 
knowledge and the leadership of the Muslim community.94  
The Qiblah, on the other hand, was an Islamist mass movement that strived to mobilize 
South African Muslims against apartheid, particularly in the first half of the 1980s. It was 
established by Achmad Cassiem, a veteran Muslim anti-apartheid activist, who had taken part in 
the armed activities of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the early 1960s and got imprisoned 
on Robben Island for several years. The Qiblah was a strong proponent of a revolutionary 
struggle against the apartheid regime, which rested upon Islamic teachings and values. 
“Ideology, and especially the ideology of Islam,” Cassiem argued, “encourages and creates 
social consciousness, identity, solidarity and inspires positive action on a scale which no other 
ideology has done or can do.”95 The success of the Iranian revolutionaries was the proof. The 
Qiblah both organized and engaged in various protests, rallies and funerals and represented the 
militant force among Muslims with its resistance to the state authority at the streets of the Cape. 
Furthermore, approving of the use of violence in a revolutionary struggle, it became part of the 
armed struggle against the state by 1984 and was violently crushed by the regime from then on.96 
It should come as no surprise that Esack joined the MYM after returning to the country. 
In the early 1980s, the MYM was the mainstream Islamist movement in South Africa, which was 
widely organized and highly appealing to Muslim youth. As a former anti-apartheid activist 
involved in the Black Consciousness tradition, he came back from Pakistan as an educated young 
 
94 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence. 
 
95 Achmad Cassiem, Quest for Unity (Great Britain: IHRC Press, 2011), 86. 
 
96 Muhammed Haron, “Qibla Mass Movement and Its Leadership: Engaging with the Quran in an African Setting” 
(paper presented at 10th International Conference on Quranic Researches, Qum, Iran, April 2017), 20, 
https://www.academia.edu/31722804/Qibla_Mass_Movement_and_its_Leadership_Engaging_with_the_Quran_in_a
n_African_Setting; Tayob, “Islamism in South Africa.” 
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person who was in search of a struggle in which he could merge his religious and political 
commitments. Moreover, the MYM’s teachings and methods closely resembled the Muslim 
Brotherhood tradition, which Esack had been familiar with from Pakistan.97  Yet, due to his early 
experience with Christian Pakistanis and the realities of the anti-apartheid struggle in South 
Africa, he could not embrace the existing form of Islamism as a whole and grew increasingly 
disgruntled with the exclusionary religiopolitical discourse of the MYM. After serving briefly on 
the National Executive of the MYM, Esack left the movement in 1983. A few years after his 
contentious departure, he would describe his old MYM friends as Muslim “fundamentalists” 
who saw Islam as the only path to the truth and were not friendly towards Christians: “It was 
pleasant being in that crowd, but… there was one thing that bothered me all the time, that if my 
friends from Pakistan were to come to South Africa, would I be able to introduce them to my 
MYM friends… and I could not, and that made me feel that there were contradictions in my 
life.”98  
But the rupture between the MYM and Esack came out of the diverging approaches 
occurred within the organization concerning the issue of partaking in the UDF. The UDF came 
into being in 1983 amid widespread protests against the new Tricameral Parliament, which was 
designed by the apartheid regime to break the rising power of opposition politics.99 “As a united 
 
97 According to Esack, the MYM was in fact part of a transnational Islamist network coordinated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and it was the most powerful Islamist movement in the early 1980s.  
 
98 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 25. In the following years, Esack would use the term fundamentalism with more 
caution by drawing attention to the different meanings it designated in Christian and Islamic contexts and prefer the 
term “Resurgent Islam” to describe mainstream Islamist trends. See Farid Esack, “Contemporary Religious Thought 
in South Africa and the Emergence of Qur’anic Hermeneutical Notions,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 2, 
no. 2 (1991): 212. 
 
99 For a broader history of the apartheid regime and the role of the UDF in the anti-apartheid struggle, see Saul 
Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2014). Introduced by the Constitution of 1983, the 
Tricameral Parliament provided Indian and “colored” communities with partial political representation whereas 
black South Africans would remain unrepresented. Most “coloreds” and Indians, of which Muslims had constituted 
a considerable part, did not accept the new system, and the call for boycott for the 1984 election became very 
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front of religious, civic, trade, and student organizations,” the UDF had also paved the way for 
Muslims to join “the national anti-apartheid struggle according to their religious rather than 
ethnic identity.” Some MYM members including Esack wanted the MYM to be an affiliate of the 
UDF to be part of the mainstream anti-apartheid struggle.100 When the MYM leadership decided 
not to cooperate with the UDF, Esack had to leave the movement together with his friends 
Ebrahim Rasool, Adli Jacobs, and Shamil Manie. Before their departure, those four Muslim 
activists had already personally known each other well and “joined other UDF activists in door-
to-door activities, such as the Million Signature campaign, to mobilize affected communities 
against the tricameral elections and distribute Grassroots newsletters at bus stops and trains 
stations.”101  
A mass rally organized by those friends in 1984 became the founding moment of a new 
South African Islamist movement. The organization gathered almost 8000 Muslims at a mosque 
 
successful when the voter turnout was recorded very low in those communities: Vollenhoven, “South Africa at the 
Crossroads.” According to Inga Niehaus, this was the time by which Muslims should decide whether they would 
take side with the apartheid-regime or root for the underdog by supporting the anti-apartheid struggle. After the 
elections, it was clear that the second option had been embraced by a vast majority of the Muslim community: 
Niehaus, “South Africa’s Muslims Between Participation and Exclusion.” 
 
100 Jill E. Kelly, “‘It Is Because of Our Islam That We Are There’: The Call of Islam in the United Democratic Front 
Era,” African Historical Review 41, no. 1 (2009): 120. Serving in the commission of political affairs and responsible 
for contacting different actors of anti-apartheid struggle, Esack had the opportunity to meet Don Mattera, Neville 
Alexander and John James Issel and strongly advocated for the affiliation with the UDF: Esack, interview by 
Frederikse, 27. 
 
101 Adli Jacobs, Punching Above Its Weight: The Story of the Call of Islam (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2014), 
Kindle edition. Grassroots was a popular anti-apartheid community newspaper that focused on “the everyday 
struggles of ordinary people.” See Ineke van Kessel, “‘Grassroots’: From Washing Lines to Utopia” in South 
Africa’s Resistance Press, eds. Les Switzer and Mohamed Adhikari (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000), 
283-326. Grassroots also gave wide coverage to the South African Muslim community and published many articles, 
particularly about Muslim anti-apartheid movements and activists. See, for example, “Muslims call for election 
boycott,” Grassroots 5, no. 5, June 1984, 13; “Imam flees S. Africa,” Grassroots 6, no. 8, October 1985, 3 (a 
detailed coverage of how Hassan Solomon fled the country to Saudi Arabia); “Call adapting to political conditions,” 
Grassroots 8, no. 10, December 1987, 4; “Qibla man gets six years,” Grassroots 9, no. 8, November 1988, 5 
(published with a half-page family photo of Achmad Cassiem, his wife, and their three children). 
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in the Cape against the tricameral elections.102 That was one of the biggest protests led by 
Muslims at the time and the participants were “Muslims who wanted to fight Apartheid from a 
Muslim perspective,” emphasized Adli Jacobs.103 The organizers who called themselves 
“Muslims against oppression” handed out a newsletter titled “the Call of Islam,” which would 
become soon the name of the new movement.104 The success of the organization encouraged 
them to launch a new initiative in Cape Town that aimed to mobilize Muslims against the 
apartheid state.105 With very limited financial and organizational sources but with great 
commitment and promising community support, they founded the Call the same year and 
immediately joined the UDF in its struggle for liberation.106 Call leaders including Esack were 
very active in the grassroot movement and served in the administrative bodies of the UDF.  
 
102 Some of the speakers at the event were Farid Esack, Hassan Solomon, Ebrahim Rasool, and Ebrahim Moosa. 
 
103 Jacobs, Story of the Call of Islam. 
 
104 Written in a poster of the rally was a quote from Ali, a cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, known for 
his devotion to justice: “Three kinds of people shall not be under the shade of Allah’s mercy on the Day of 
Judgement. The oppressor, the one who assists the oppressor and the one who remains silent in the face of 
oppression.” Muslims Against Oppression, “Mass Rally,” poster, ca 1984, South African History Online Archives, 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/call-islam-mass-rally-muslims-against-oppression. 
 
105 It should be noted here that Cape Town has some distinct demographic characteristics, particularly in terms of its 
“colored” and Muslim populations. It is the second most populous city and having the largest Muslim population in 
South Africa. The ratio of Muslims to the general population in the city is also considerably higher than other cities. 
The vast majority of the Muslim population consists of those termed “colored.” Also, Cape Town has been 
historically populated mostly by “colored” people due to its status under the apartheid regime. According to some 
studies, Muslims’ attachment to their religious identity is very strong there, compared to ethnic and national 
identities. See, for example, Yusuf da Costa, “Muslims in Greater Cape Town: A Problem of Identity,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 45, no. 2 (June 1994): 235-246. This is important to understand the nature of Muslim anti-
apartheid activism which was most powerful in the Cape Town area as well as the social context within which both 
Farid Esack and the Call of Islam pursued most of their political activities. 
 
106 Interestingly, however, Call became officially affiliated with the UDF in 1987: “Call of Islam Joins the UDF,” 
Grassroots 8, no. 3, May 1987, 2. 
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The Call was a closed organization led by a small cadre of Muslim activists.107 It worked 
in cells and recruited members through certain procedures to make sure of their ideological fit 
with the organization, and the public membership was not allowed.108 It was therefore an 
effective movement consisting of committed members. On the other hand, the Call engaged in 
massive mobilization efforts and became a driving force in the Muslim anti-apartheid struggle. It 
“organized mass rallies, public meetings, Friday sermons focused on the “call” of Islam, door-to-
door campaigns, funerals, boycotts, and religious and political pamphlets, and published a 
monthly newsletter.”109 It also contributed significantly to the organization of interfaith meetings 
and protests. Although the Call did not openly support the armed struggle, some of its members 
participated in the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC).110 
According to the Call, all the oppressed of South Africa was suffering under the same 
racist and discriminatory regime. The problem was, therefore, not a religious one peculiar to the 
Muslim community, but a human problem influencing all those termed “non-white” regardless of 
their religion or faith.111 Since the trouble was one, then the struggle had to be one. The Call paid 
 
107 Though Adli Jacobs did not mention Imam Hassan Solomon as part of the cadre, Esack said that Solomon was 
both a co-founder of the movement and its first and only amir, the supreme leader, until he went into exile in 1985. 
Solomon was an eminent public figure invited very often to speak at rallies, sermons, and interfaith gatherings. 
108 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 30. According to both Jacobs and Esack, the total number of Call members was 
no more than two hundred countrywide. 
 
109 Tayob, “Islamism in South Africa.” As Shamil Jeppie pointed out, the funerals of Muslims killed by the security 
forces had often turned into mass protests led by anti-apartheid movements where “Amandla jostled with Allahu 
Akbar – an Islamic revolutionary call:” Jeppie, “Amandla and Allahu Akbar,” 15. One of those funerals was that of 
the 31-year-old Ebrahim Carelse from Cape Town, where Hassan Solomon led the procession that had been attended 
by thousands of people: “10,000 mourners at the funeral of Ebrahim Carelse,” Congress Resister 3, no. 3, October 
1985, 1 (published with a photo of the coffin seen in front of the banner, which read the following verse from the 
Qur’an: “Oh who you believe! We have ordered you to retaliate in the crime of murder”). 
    
110 Jacobs, Story of the Call of Islam. In a lecture he delivered in London in 1988, Esack said that he had supported, 
in the Cape Town Supreme Court, a number of Muslim militants who defended themselves with reference to the 
Islamic teachings. Esack argued in the court that they were theologically right since “the Qur’an did not only allow 
victims of oppression to take up arms in defense of their dignity but also encouraged them to do.” 
 
111 Esack, “Three Islamic Strands.” 
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more attention to the local conditions of South Africa than holding on to universal Islamic ideas, 
unlike the MYM and the Qiblah.112 They supported interfaith solidarity, defended arm-in-arm 
struggle with non-Muslims, and promoted women’s participation in the anti-apartheid struggle. 
“The texts of the Call of Islam inscribed a vision of reality for developing a new anti-apartheid 
Muslim discourse against the state” and the emerging discourse also shook the authority of the 
traditional Ulama.113 Contrary to the ulama’s conservative goal of the “preservation of Islam,” 
the priority for the Call was, above all, to fight for the cause of the disenfranchised and struggle 
for liberation with anyone who committed herself to the “objective of a non-racial, non-sexist, 
democratic and just South Africa.”114 
The leading role Esack played within the Call as the national coordinator was significant 
not only in terms of the strategic and political choices of the movement but also in terms of its 
ideological and theological orientation. His expertise in Islamic studies and his early encounter 
with Christian liberation theology enabled Esack to come up with the idea of a liberative 
theology he and his friends would collectively shape during the anti-apartheid struggle. In an 
interview in the year 1987, Esack said he came to believe that what they had been experimenting 
theologically with the Call made them the pioneers in Islamic liberation theology, particularly 
after he witnessed the level of appreciation their works had obtained in overseas meetings.115 
 
112 Kelly, “The Call of Islam.” 
 
113 Iqbal Jhazbhay, “The Politics of Interpretation: The Call of Islam and Ulama Disciplinary Power in South 
Africa,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 22, no. 2 (2002): 45. 
 
114 Ebrahim Moosa, “Muslim Conservatism in South Africa,” The Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 69 
(December 1989), 78; Esack, “Three Islamic Strands,” 492. 
 
115 Esack, interview by Frederikse, 24. 
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Esack was also the author of the fundamental texts published by the Call during the 1980s.116 
From the mutualism between action and faith to the emphasis put on the agency of the 
downtrodden, there were clear signs of a liberation theology embedded in those texts. Therefore, 
without downplaying the collective effort put into the Call’s struggle and the influence on the 
Call of non-Muslim anti-apartheid organizations, it is necessary to acknowledge Esack’s major 
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ISLAM AND POLITICS: INTRA-MUSLIM DEBATES AND DIVERGING PATHS 
Islamist Challenge to the Conservative Ulama 
There was one very important common thread running through the rising anti-apartheid 
Islamist movements of the 1980s: They all posed a serious challenge to the authority of the 
traditional ulama organizations in South Africa represented mainly by the Muslim Judicial 
Council (MJC), the Jamiatul Ulama of Transvaal, the Jamiatul Ulama of Natal, and the Majlisul 
Ulama of South Africa. Those ulama bodies consisted of traditionally-trained theologians who 
were responsible for “the interpretation of the law, ethics, morality and religious values of Islam” 
and, thus, had “the authority and power over the religious symbols.”117 They were also the 
standard-bearer of a politically conservative approach and had considerable social authority 
within the South African Muslim community.118 The Islamist challenge to their authority was 
multifaceted. First, Islamists broke up the monopoly over interpretation of religious sources. 
That monopoly had been almost exclusively enjoyed by the Muslim clergy over decades. 
Second, Islamists proposed alternative political routes to the “apolitical” stance of the ulama 
organizations. Those alternative routes were much more attractive to the Muslim youth who were 
desperately discontent with the apartheid regime. Third, Islamists challenged also the social 
power of the clergy. They did so  particularly by way of creating new social organizations and 
 
117 Ebrahim Moosa, “Muslim Conservatism in South Africa,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 69 
(December 1989): 73-81. 
 
118 The only exception was the MJC. See Rabia Pandy, “A Critical Look at the Role of the Muslim Judicial Council 
in the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa from 1960-1994,” (Honors thesis, University of Cape Town, 1994). 
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transforming some of the ulama-dominated social spaces, such as mosques, into lively platforms 
for critical social debates.  
Iqbal Jhazbhay, a former Call member, argued that the tense relationship between modern 
Islamic movements and the ulama was shaped substantially by the “sharp conflict between those 
who were searching for meaning in the Qur’an and its relevance to their lives in South Africa 
and those who claimed to have exclusive access to interpretative understanding.”119 The latter 
consisted of scholars who were trained in traditional religious institutions and thus became 
“authorized” commentators of Islamic sources.120 They, therefore, considered themselves and 
were considered by the majority of the South African Muslim community as the sole legitimate 
class of people who could produce religious meaning and laws. This authority was seriously 
challenged by a new generation of youth and professionals who were educated in modern 
institutions.121 The religious knowledge provided by the ulama members was inadequate in 
addressing the social and political problems they had been wrestling with on a daily basis. This 
inadequacy made them heavily interested in discovering “social and political aspects of Islam” in 
the South African context.  
In this regard, one major source of knowledge for them would be the writings of Islamist 
intellectuals such as Hasan al-Banna, Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati. Those 
 
119 Jhazbhay, “The Politics of Interpretation,” 458.  
 
120 The Deobandi tradition and the Tablighi Jamaat were influential in the formation of and support for some of 
those organizations. See Ingram, Deoband Movement and Global, 166 and Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South 
Africa, 70. 
 
121 Abdulkader Tayob, “Islamism in South Africa.” Esack and Ebrahim Moosa, both of whom were maulanas, were 
exceptions in that sense. Yet, they were not part of the ivory-tower clergy but just in the middle of the struggle 
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injustice, against the backdrop of the conservative ulama groups who remained silent about the apartheid regime: 
Meer, foreword to But Musa Went to Firaun!: A Compilation of Questions and Answers about the Role of Muslims 
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figures, who challenged the archaic and conservative nature of the ulama authority, provided the 
new generation of South African Muslims with a fresh religious perspective. Through that 
perspective, they became able to reconsider the meaning of Muslimness in their own 
circumstances and to deal with the issues surrounding them, from secularism to racism to socio-
economic deprivation. Besides Islamist literature, another fundamental source of knowledge was 
the reading and discussion groups, called halaqat (circles). First the MYM and then the Call 
established halaqat in order to critically read and discuss portions from the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah and interpret them in light of contemporary social and political developments. This was, 
no doubt, a radical departure from the traditional religious knowledge production.  
First, each Muslim, irrespective of whether s/he had religious training or not, was 
encouraged to participate in producing religious knowledge. In other words, the ulama bodies 
were no longer the only authority in that respect. That was the process of what Esack called the 
“deprofessionalization of Islam.” According to Esack, “the only long-term solution to the 
problem of this mutually destructive symbiotic relationship” between the “omnipotent imam” 
and the “Muslim patient” who “lends himself to religious leadership”  was to forge a new 
theology free from the domination and obscurantism of the clergy.122 Second, the same process 
also brought about questioning the capability as well as the intention of the Muslim clergy to 
reform the religious discourse. The ulama’s fierce reaction against “novel” interpretations 
coming from “non-professional” Muslims and their insistence on ready-made recipes were not in 
any way promising. As a result, the ulama’s “disciplinary power based on supervision and 
control,” particularly “in the domain of interpretation of the Qur’an,” was undermined by 
 




Islamists who decisively went beyond the long-established limits on religious knowledge 
production.123  
According to Ebrahim Moosa, a prominent Muslim scholar and a former MYM leader, the 
conservative nature of the political discourse generated by the ulama organizations can be 
explained under three broad categories.124 Firstly, they strictly advocated the idea of obedience to 
as well as non-confrontation with, the ruling authority. They asserted that unless it prevented 
Muslims from performing their basic religious practices and having some autonomous social 
space, there was no place, theologically, for challenging political authority, no matter how 
oppressive it was in other domains. This became clearer in their position of not explicitly 
condemning the apartheid regime despite its widespread and systematic employment of racist, 
discriminatory and violent policies towards those termed “non-white” people including Muslims. 
Moosa argued that “this type of political theology,” which aimed to “promote a policy of 
moderation and cohesion against lawlessness and chaos,” was “neither unauthentic nor 
inaccurate in terms of the mainstream Muslim tradition.”125 
Secondly, when political mobilization among Muslims was on the rise in the 1980s due to 
the hardening conditions of the apartheid regime and the transnational effect of the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution, most ulama members regarded the increasing activism and the 
accompanying pro-revolutionary discourse as the “politics of heresy.” The emergence of an 
Islamic state through Iranian people’s own efforts was a great political success on behalf of the 
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“ummah,” global Muslim community, and this was not only very welcomed but also taken as an 
inspirational example by many Muslims around the world. When it came to the South African 
context, “for the first time,” Moosa argued, “Muslims found a point of reference for their religio-
moral struggle which coincided with the revolutionary zeal prevalent at the time among 
liberation movements in South Africa.”126 In this context, the ulama, as the flag-bearer of 
traditional Sunni Islam, immediately produced an anti-Shia discourse which fiercely condemned 
and even accused as “heretic” and “unbeliever” the ones who espoused the revolutionary 
ideology of Iran.127 Moosa contended that it was essentially not about confessional disputes but 
about power relations. The “deepening animosity between radicals and conservatives disguised 
itself in a controversy over the legitimacy of Shi’ism” and sectarian polemics was selectively 
used by the Muslim clergy “in order to theologically discredit groups hostile to the political 
interests of the conservative Ulama.”128  
Esack also was quite critical of the ulama’s passivity and its accusations against the 
Islamist movements. In his writings and preachings during the anti-apartheid struggle, he 
continuously challenged the theological arguments put forward by the ulama. He argued that it 
was not possible to separate revelation and revolution since “revolution is a part of 
revelation.”129 Furthermore, “neutrality in the face of Apartheid borders on kufr [rejection of 
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God],” according to Esack, since Muslims had to struggle against injustices as part of their 
belief.130 Islam was not a religion of moderation but a religion that required the believer to take 
action against oppression. Esack would formulate that binary later as “accommodation theology 
vs. liberation theology.” 
The third criticism the ulama organizations directed against the Muslim anti-apartheid 
struggle was the cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims. They argued that being 
together with non-Muslims, who were assumed to follow untruthful paths, would pollute the 
“pristine character of Islam” and bring about the “dislocation of existing socio-moral structures 
and the deterioration of Shar’i (religious) authority.”131 This belief led the Muslim clergy to use 
the notion of fitnah, namely sedition and civil strife, as a weapon against untraditional religious 
ideas and political practices of Islamists. The majority of the ulama thought that the Islamist 
activism was politicizing Islam, breaking the unity of the ummah and putting the interests of the 
Muslim community in danger. They, therefore, were causing fitnah and contributing to infidel 
politics. Furthermore, the political cooperation of Islamists with leftists, Christians or atheists 
was the sign of “heresy and deviation.” Esack utterly rejected those claims and insistently 
underlined the necessity of a unified struggle by drawing attention to the South African reality: 
If we are thinking of Muslims running into separate directions when the police start 
shooting, or Muslim factory workers striking on a different day from the other 
workers… then it would hardly make any sense. The truth is that our people-
Muslim and non-Muslim-live together. We have suffered together and our children 
have died on the streets of Cape Town together.132 
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Abdulkader Tayob described this discourse of fitnah rightly as the “ideology of conservatism” 
whose program was constituted by “passivism, self-preservation, and the symbol of the 
community.”133 This is exactly why Islamist anti-apartheid politics, with its considerable amount 
of community support, was so annoying and threatening for the traditional Muslim clergy.  
Besides challenging the Ulama in the spheres of religious knowledge production and local 
politics, Islamists also aimed to transform the nature of social spaces and organizations 
dominated by the conservative Ulama ideology. Abdullah Haron was the first religious leader 
who turned his mosque “into a versatile community center” in which social and political issues 
were constantly discussed both among Muslims themselves and with members from non-Muslim 
communities.134 The same mosque, under the leadership of first Hassan Solomon and then 
Rashied Omar, would be a home for young Muslim activists struggling against the apartheid 
regime: “During the anti-apartheid years,” pointed out Rashied Omar, “our mosque was a place 
for people to come together to express their grievances concerning the situation in the apartheid 
regime. There would be meetings of young people planning protests inside the mosque. For us, 
this was not political activity; this was a struggle for justice.”135 Esack also pointed out the need 
for the democratization of mosque administrations. He suggested that shura, the principle of 
consultation, should be understood in a broader sense as a “process of participatory democracy” 
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and that, alongside accountability, it should become the chief principle of mosque 
management.136  
Also, during the 1970s and the 1980s, Islamist movements attempted seriously to involve 
women actively in their organizations and to increase awareness of injustices that Muslim 
women experienced in social life. For example, the MYM campaigned for “women to be allowed 
spaces in mosques” and that campaign “attracted the most vitriolic response from the “ulama.”137 
They frequently discussed the issue of women’s roles in Islam through critically engaging with 
religious sources. The Call took a step further and developed a more progressive agenda of 
which gender justice was one of the fundamental topics.138 Since its inception in 1984, the Call 
insistently stressed its belief in the equality of men and women and the need for women’s 
liberation. They “deliberately appointed woman marshals for marches and funerals and ensured 
that its activists mixed with members of the opposite gender in public meetings. Internally, men 
and women met together, prayed together and had mixed halaqāt.”139 In response to the 
increasing visibility of Muslim women in public spaces and their gradual social empowerment, 
“conservatives mount a moral crusade in order to blame radical activists for the breakdown in 
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family and religious morality.”140 Resorting to the accusation of immorality as well as of causing 
fitnah was another sign of the deterioration of the ulama authority, this time in social life. 
Transnational Islamism versus South African Struggle 
The serious conflicts between the Islamist movements and the conservative Muslim clergy, 
ranging from production of religious knowledge to their political approaches to the contest over 
social spaces, did not mean that the two sides constituted homogenous entities without any 
internal diversity or divisions. In fact, Islamist organizations differed considerably from each 
other in terms of political goals and strategies. They sometimes stood side by side against the 
ulama and the apartheid regime, and attempted to unify the struggle; other times, they openly 
challenged and even fought each other over diverging policies. More importantly, they sharply 
parted ways on theorizing Muslim politics. On the one hand, they all laid great stress on the 
political aspect of Islam and based their political and social projects on the Qur’an and the 
prophetic tradition; on the other, they had conflicting interpretations regarding political teachings 
embedded in religious sources as well as regarding the necessities of South African politics. The 
main point of divergence among Islamist anti-apartheid movements was about how they related 
their struggle to universal understanding of Islamism. There were different positions in that 
regard ranging from supporting transnational Muslim community to searching for a particularly 
South African Islam. This diversity was reflected in other crucial points of conflict such as how 
they approached fundamental religious sources, particularly the Qur’an, what kind of society and 
state they aimed at, and with whom they considered it necessary to carry out political struggle. 
 
140 Moosa, “Muslim Conservatism.” 
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As Esack himself pointed out, “developments in the world of Islam as a whole were 
essentially reflected in the dynamics of the Islamic movement in South Africa.”141 The Muslim 
Youth Movement (MYM) was the major actor in that regard. From its inception, it had very 
close relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e Islami. They invited speakers 
from those movements to give series of seminars to students.142 Those speakers “clearly stood 
out in their significant contribution to the Muslim Youth Movement’s systematic exposure to the 
global Islamist traditions.”143 Furthermore, some works of the leading Islamist intellectuals 
Sayyid Qutb and Abu’l Ala Maududi were translated and published by Al-Qalam, the newspaper 
of the MYM, and they were widely discussed in halaqat groups.144 Al-Qalam also carried 
messages and news from different Muslim communities around the world to South African 
Muslims.145 As Shamil Jeppie pointed out, the global trend of Islamism shaped substantially the 
organizational and conceptual nature of the South African Islamist movements: “This 
development was a radical break from everything organizational that had gone before. And so, 
via the published track, the cassette, the youth camp and conference, and visiting scholars – most 
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often not formally trained ‘religious experts’ – the ‘Islamic revival’ was imported, felt, and 
imagined.146  
In this context, it was clear that the MYM was heavily interested in global Islamist 
thought at the expense of ignoring South African realities. The effects on the MYM’s political 
discourse of global Islamist trends was obvious in many aspects. First of all, MYM members 
started to perceive Islam “as a way of life” that encompasses not only religious but also social 
and political fields.147 Based chiefly on Maududi’s teachings, they espoused the idea that Islam 
was not a religion; it was, on the contrary, a deen/din, which rejects reducing religion into private 
sphere and embraces all aspects of life.148 The idea of Islam as a comprehensive way of life was 
accompanied by the perception of Islam as an ideology. The MYM believed that Islam preached 
the guiding principles for a just political struggle and a comprehensive social project. The goal 
was to reach an Islamized society and then create an Islamic political regime. They had a 
“bottom up” approach, which was not revolutionary but gradualist. The MYM would undertake 
the role of “vanguard” in this project of Islamizing the South African society.149 
They [MYM] promoted the visibility of Muslims in all spheres of life, thereby projecting 
a strong sense of Islamic identity in their public activities. They set up a newspaper in 1974 
called al-Qalam; founded a missionary movement (Islamic Daʼwa Movement); established 
a book and tape service which later became a chain of bookstores (International Book 
Services); set up a national zakāt collection fund (1977); and formed professional bodies 
for Muslim medical doctors, accountants and lawyers. Clearly, the Muslim Youth 
Movement wished to Islamize South Africa anew.150 
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The Iranian revolution also had tremendous influence on South African Islamism. 
Although the MYM did not attempt to follow the revolutionary path, they did not consider the 
Iranian revolution “as anything else but an outstanding symbol for the power of Islam.”151 It was 
a fundamental source of self-confidence and political determination for South African Islamists. 
In terms of political strategy, the MYM was especially interested in the pivotal role Iranian 
mullahs played in the success of the revolution, and they began to send students abroad for better 
religious education.152 However, the major effect of the revolution on South African Islamism 
was the foundation of the Qiblah Mass Movement in 1980. Achmad Cassiem, a determined anti-
apartheid activist and the ideologue of the Qiblah, tried to adapt the ideas and strategies of the 
revolution to the South African context.153 
According to Achmad Cassiem, the MYM was an elitist organization which was 
education-oriented and politically moderate.154 For him, Islam was a revolutionary ideology, and 
it was not simply an ideology among other ideologies, but the only true one.155 Cassiem believed 
that the struggle between the apartheid regime and the oppressed majority was a variation of the 
confrontation between the Shah’s regime in Iran and the oppressed masses led by Ruhollah 
Khomeini, whose “sayings and image” had been popularized “in the streets of Cape Town” by 
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the Qiblah.156 This perspective was in stark contrast with the gradualist approach of the MYM. 
Not surprisingly, the struggle of Qiblah members, which had started through challenging the 
state in the streets, ended up participating in the armed resistance.157 
However, unlike the popular belief, Cassiem’s ideology was not shaped exclusively by 
Islamic teachings. He was in close contact with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which 
brought together the ideas of nationalism, socialism, and pan-Africanism.158 Moreover, some 
Qiblah members were “also PAC members.”159 Cassiem himself did not give credit to socialism 
as an ideology but he always considered all the oppressed of South Africa as the natural 
component of a Islamic struggle for justice.160 For him, the long-standing African experience of 
colonialism and racism should come to an end with a common struggle led by the Muslim 
ummah, which he defined as “the vanguard of the oppressed.”161 Also, although substantially 
influenced by the Iranian experience, Cassiem did not explicitly present an Islamic state as the 
final goal of the struggle.162 It is thus clear that the (South) African context was more decisive in 
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shaping Cassiem’s (and the Qiblah’s) ideological position than the MYM’s despite the fact that 
transnational Islamism had a huge impact also on Cassiem’s political thinking and strategy. 
Esack, the then national coordinator of the Call, argued that “If the MYM were the first to 
fuse the process of Islamization with the collective wisdom of the latter-day Islamic Movement 
(…) and if Qiblah were the first to introduce South African Muslims to a political and 
revolutionary Islam which identified with the oppressed masses, then the Call of Islam was the 
first to draw its inspiration from universal peace movements and to emphasize the essential 
oneness of humankind.”163 Esack’s emphasis on “universal movements” other than Islamist ones 
and on the “oneness of humankind” instead of the “Muslim ummah” reveals how the Call 
differentiated itself from the MYM and the Qiblah. The Call developed a radical critique of 
global Islamist trends and attempted to construct a South African Islamism that essentially drew 
on the experience and the needs of South Africans engaging in the anti-apartheid struggle. In that 
regard, the Call became open to benefit critically from non-Islamic ideologies and theologies, 
and to constructive dialogue with non-Muslim organizations and persons constituting the main 
component of the anti-apartheid struggle. That approach laid the groundwork for South African 
Islamic liberation theology and would also constitute the core of Esack’s own conceptualization. 
According to the Call, what Muslims experienced in apartheid South Africa was not 
about their religious identity or ideology but about the discriminatory and racist political regime 
denying the majority of South Africans the right to live as human.164 It was thus necessary to 
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build political struggle not within a closed Muslim community with exclusive references to 
Islamist literature, but together with the oppressed masses of South Africa regardless of their 
religious, cultural and ideological background. It did not mean, however, that the Call gave up 
claim to Islam as its base for political thought and action. It continued to base its ideas on the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah and benefit selectively from Islamist literature. For example, the Call 
members were reading the works of Ali Shariati and Mahmoud Taleghani but the impact they 
had on the Call was minimal, Esack asserted, when compared to the influence of transnational 
Islamist discourse on the MYM and the Qiblah.165 Moreover, as Esack pointed out, ideologically, 
the Call was coming from the Islamist tradition and its search for a South African Islam resulted 
in a “marriage between the Islamic Movement idea of a comprehensive Islam and “the Struggle,” 
the battle against apartheid.”166 The Call thus described itself as part of “the progressive Islamic 
movement” or “progressive Islamism” during the anti-apartheid struggle.167  
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On the other hand, the Call directed very harsh criticisms against other Islamist 
movements. For example, Esack criticized the MYM for having a “simplistic appreciation of the 
universality of Islam” and, therefore, being stuck to a “vaguely defined social and cultural 
‘commitment to the establishment of Allah’s order in South Africa.’”168 According to the Call, 
the fundamental political responsibility of South African Muslims was to unconditionally 
confront any evil and injustice in their society irrespective of who suffered most and who led the 
opposition. Also, unlike the Qiblah, the Call emphasized that Muslims should not be the 
vanguard but comrades of the oppressed. Since they were all human and exposed to the same 
cruelty, then their struggle should be based on solidarity and cooperation without any hierarchy 
of religion, ethnicity, gender or ideology. “Most conscientious Muslims under apartheid,” 
Ebrahim Moosa similarly argued, “felt that this immoral practice had to be resisted and 
combated because it was deemed an affront to a common humanity. Self-serving ethnic and 
religious interests had to be cast aside on moral grounds since they conflicted with the universal 
vision of Islam” that acknowledged that humanity was a single community.169 
The turning point for the divergence in South African Islamism was the hot discussions 
that took place around the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the early 1980s. Since its 
inception, the Call closely cooperated with the UDF and, thus, became part of the mainstream 
anti-apartheid struggle dominated by the then exiled African National Congress (ANC). Its main 
cadre consisted of ex-MYM members and some progressive ulama, and it “was to a large extent 
the birthchild of activists, torn in their allegiance between the UDF and the MYM.”170 When the 
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UDF was founded, the MYM decidedly stood against its members who were eager to take part in 
the UDF and took a stand of “positive neutrality‟ which meant joining the anti-apartheid struggle 
without cooperation with any non-Muslim organization.171  
As Esack pointed out, there were three objections by the MYM to “alliances with the 
religious Other in general and with the UDF in particular.”172 Firstly, political alliances 
compromise the superiority of Islam as “the principal liberating power.” Secondly, becoming 
part of a secular movement poses a challenge to the holistic view of Islam and makes it a religion 
among others. Thirdly, Muslims cannot accept democracy as a political system simply because it 
attempts to share the absolute sovereignty of God. In response to the objections, the Call heartily 
defended both its political alliance with the UDF and its general political discourse promoting 
interfaith and interideological solidarity. The Call’s position had relied on theological, political 
and strategic arguments. For the first, the Call put forward the same argument it had presented 
against the ulama accusations. Under oppressive and unjust conditions, Muslims had the 
responsibility to stand for justice and there was no ban on cooperation with non-Muslims in 
fundamental Islamic sources.  Moreover, the fact that Prophet Muhammad himself had been part 
of that sort of cooperation constituted an inspiring and supportive example for Call members.173  
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For the second, the Call believed that its participation in a non-Muslim organization was 
not in any way downgrading the prestige of Islam. Call members took part in the struggle 
confidently with their Muslim identity.174 Furthermore, the Islamic anti-apartheid discourse they 
generated was greatly appreciated by their non-Muslim comrades.175 For the third, The Call’s 
goal was neither to Islamize the South African society nor to establish an Islamic political system 
in a country in which Muslims constituted less than two percent of the population. Moreover, the 
Call did not think that the only way to establish a just system was to base it on Islamic law. What 
was crucial for a just sociopolitical system was, according to the Call, being free from any form 
of inequality and discrimination. Besides MYM’s objections, Achmad Cassiem also denounced 
the UDF as a “movement devoid of revolutionary method, revolutionary action and ‘ideological 
clarity’“ and harshly criticized and even attacked Muslims supporting it, primarily Call members, 
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mainly for falling outside of the belief that “Islamic is the only solution.”176 In that regard, the 
Call gave references to “the roles of Musa and Yeshua in Egypt as well as the Prophet 
Muhammad’s treaty at Hudaybiyyah” and underlined the virtues of negotiation between the 
leaders of the fighting sides if there occurred an opportunity for that.177 The Call argued that the 
option of negotiation would prevent revolutionary violence from becoming the only path to 
solution and enable the oppressed side to reveal its ethical ethos to the oppressors.178 
The Call’s alliance with the UDF meant its rejection of the ummah as a political ideal. 
Esack, as one of the ideologues and leaders of the Call, attached great importance to the debate 
on the Muslim unity within the South African context. Despite its popularity among Muslims 
around the world during the 1980s, the political idea of the global ummah was not attainable in 
South Africa. In fact, it “has never been a reality,” Esack pointed out, “since the death of the 
Holy Prophet.”179 Without looking to the reasons for the rise of that idea then, Esack simply 
began with looking at the local reality. The disenfranchised of the country was in the need of 
“maximum unity” to eradicate the apartheid regime, and the elimination of the apartheid regime 
was necessary to bring justice to South Africa. Struggle for justice was the responsibility of all 
Muslims. The essence was justice whereas the form might change according to the context. The 
desired form in a non-Muslim majority South Africa was “a united, non-racial, non-sexist, and 
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democratic” country. Muslims, as a minority, had to partake in the struggle as long as it 
remained committed to materializing justice.180  
On the other hand, Esack did not ignore the existence of the ummah. He underlined, 
however, that the ummah was not necessarily a political collectivity but primarily a social reality. 
In a manual he authored for Call activists, Esack pointed to the four-stage strategy of spreading 
awareness: myself, my circle of faith (the halqah), my community of faith (the ummah), and the 
community of the oppressed.181 What differentiated Esack from other Islamists was the 
introduction of the last stage into the scheme. Most Islamists considered the community of faith 
as the social basis of their political activism whereas Esack saw the community of the oppressed 
as the real place for political struggle. Being part of the ummah, Muslims both had the advantage 
of capitalizing on their religious heritage and the responsibility for correcting the failing 
elements of their tradition. At the same time, Muslims had to advance the struggle into the realm 
of society because the target was not liberation for only co-religionists but for all the 
marginalized. Esack believed that in many cases the call for Muslim unity was a call for a “single 
understanding of Islam” at the expense of alternative views and a thirst for political power and 
authority in the name of a certain communal identity.182 That was in contrast with the real 
strength of the idea of the ummah: the “unequivocal rejection of tribalism and racism” and 
“rejoicing in inclusivism and diversity.”183 According to Esack, the ummah, “at its best, is thus 
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an open-ended community under one universal God and transcends the boundaries, however 
elusive, of ancestry or ethnicity.”184 
The discordance between the Call and other Muslim organizations about the controversial 
issues such as the ummah did not necessarily make the former move away from Muslim masses, 
however. First of all, some of the leading figures of the Call, including Esack, were at the same 
time ulama members serving within the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC).185 They used their 
positions within the clergy in order both to encourage the MJC to engage in the anti-apartheid 
struggle more bravely and actively, and to make use of people’s respect to the clergy as an 
effective tool of disseminating their “radical” ideas.186 Secondly, they were cautious, not 
shocking Muslim masses with their unpopular notions. They thus adopted a “policy of tadrij” 
(gradualism) and exposed their reformist agenda step by step in order to convince ordinary 
Muslims of the reliability of their ideology.187 Thirdly, they occasionally agreed with the ulama 
and Muslim masses over some “sensitive issues” such as the common reaction against the 
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Ahmadiyya community, which was considered as heretic by the majority of the Muslim 
community.188 
It is clear that the primary basis on which the Call built its religiopolitical philosophy and 
struggle was not global Islamist thought but the South African experience of apartheid. Yet, only 
the idea of a comprehensive Islam, one of the fundamental pillars of Islamist thought, that Esack 
and the Call had embraced was enough to show the significant continuities between the 
mainstream Islamism and the progressive approach of the Call. In other words, the level of 
interaction they had with transnational Islamism and the commonalities they had with other 
South African Islamist organizations seem more influential than Call members were willing to 
admit. The untraditional and anti-traditional attitudes, the understanding of Islam as a way of 
life, the belief in the inseparable nature of Islam and politics, the conception of Islam as a 
revolutionary religion, and the foundational role of fundamental religious texts in constructing an 
ideology were all influential in shaping the Call’s progressive perspective. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the Call diverged from the mainstream Islamism of the day in significant ways and thus 
paved the way for an Islamic theology of liberation. The focus on the local conditions and the 
agency of the oppressed, the receptiveness to non-Muslim people and perspectives, the support 
for a secular democratic political regime, and the importance given to interfaith solidarity were 
the chief elements of the nascent theology, which Esack would bring to maturity in the 1990s. 
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 CHAPTER V 
TRANSLATING PRACTICE INTO THEORY:  
ESACK’S CONCEPTION OF ISLAMIC LIBERATION THEOLOGY 
Esack Parting Ways: Anti-Apartheid Struggle in Retrospect 
An Islamic liberation theology in South Africa emerged from the converging experiences 
of local Muslim communities, their minority status, the major effects of global Islamist 
developments, and the direct and extensive impact of the anti-apartheid struggle including the 
provocative sociopolitical atmosphere, the exceptional interfaith solidarity, and the intellectual 
dynamism of the political opponents. The early 1980s was the period in which the embryonic 
form of this theology came into existence mostly in relation to the diverging paths of the Islamist 
anti-apartheid movements, which I discussed in detail in the previous chapter. It gradually 
matured towards the late 1980s when the Call saw its ideology and activism improving hand in 
hand in the context of the rising anti-apartheid struggle. This was also the time when the MYM 
transformed itself later into an active player within oppositional forces thanks to its adoption of 
contextualist approach, and thus helped constituting a new platform for dialogue and solidarity 
alongside the Call.189 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the “task of formulating the 
equivalent of a Muslim liberation theology,” Ebrahim Moosa succinctly pointed out, “largely fell 
on the shoulders of a  younger generation of ‘ulama’ and activists under the influence of Islamic 
revivalism in the 1980s who began to describe the rudimentary elements of a contextual Islam in 
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South Africa.” 190 Esack was a leading figure in that respect and, ironically, his conceptualization 
of Islamic liberation theology gained momentum after he left the Call and then the country.  
In 1988, Salman Rushdie, a famous Indian-born British writer, published a novel titled 
“The Satanic Verses.” Though the book was acclaimed by many literary critics, it led to great 
anger and mass protests in Muslim communities all around the world who considered it insulting 
and hostile to the Qur’an and the life of Prophet Muhammad.191 The same year, amidst the hot 
debates and increasing assaults on Rushdie, The Weekly Mail, an anti-apartheid newspaper, and 
the Congress of South African Writers (COSAW) jointly invited Rushdie to a book fest in 
Johannesburg themed on censorship.192 The South African Muslim community banded together 
on the condemnation of Rushdie’s proposed visit and launched a public campaign that succeeded 
in leading to its cancellation.193 The Call had aligned itself with the other, mostly conservative, 
Muslim organizations in protesting the event. However, there were different ideas within the Call 
about how to approach the issue. The leadership, including Esack, was in principle neither 
against the publishing of the book nor against Rushdie’s visit to South Africa, despite being 
critical of the content of the book and empathizing with the aggrieved Muslim population. 
However, many Call members including some senior figures “bitterly opposed the tolerant 
statements” of the leadership and also supported the call for Rushdie’s death.194 The subsequent 
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intra-group disputes resulted in Esack’s resignation from, first, his position as National 
Coordinator and, then, the organization itself in 1990.195  
The year 1990 also marked a monumental milestone in the history of the apartheid 
regime. The way for formal negotiations between the state and the ANC leader Nelson Mandela 
was paved with President F. W. de Klerk’s declaration in February 1990 of the ANC’s 
unbanning and Mandela’s release. That was also the beginning of the transition from popular 
politics to party politics in South Africa. The UDF was dissolved in 1991 and many of the 
affiliated organizations became integrated into ANC politics. Unsurprisingly, the Call openly 
supported the negotiations and ANC’s political agenda, and several Call members joined the 
party.196 In the same period, Esack had detached himself from South African politics and gone to 
England in order to pursue his doctoral studies at the University of Birmingham, after a long 
wearying period of anti-apartheid activism and following his acrimonious departure from the 
Call.197 That was in fact an opportunity for Esack to engage in a process of self-critique and to 
observe, with critical distance, progressive Islamist politics in South Africa, which he had been 
part of for long years.  
Until his return to South Africa in the second half of the 1990s as a Commissioner for 
Gender Equality, Esack would have plenty of time to think about the shortcomings of 
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progressive Muslim politics, which had begun to lose its influence during the transition period of 
1990-1994. The main reason for the decline was, as Esack argued, the fact that Muslim anti-
apartheid theology had remained as a minority theology. Neither progressive Muslims’ “ad hoc 
theologizing” during the liberation struggle had gained widespread acceptance in the South 
African Muslim community, nor had all those who embraced the emergent theology internalized 
it. Conservative Muslim organizations, on the contrary, became quickly adapted to the changing 
circumstances and managed to maintain their social power. The conservative reaction came out 
of the Rushdie affair and the harsh criticisms against those, including Esack, who defended the 
freedom of expression could be considered a sign for that. Moreover, as Rashied Omar put it 
explicitly, the “once-vibrant anti-apartheid interreligious movement” was not successful in 
making “the transition from a “theology of resistance” to a “theology of reconstruction.”“198 
Therefore, during the transition period, there was a lack of attention to social injustices other 
than racism even though liberation, according to Esack, did not mean simply “an end to 
racialism” but “the empowering of all sections of the marginalized.”199 
Esack argued that progressive Islamists also suffered from “the absence of purely moral 
imperatives,” since the struggle for power had just started as the struggle of liberation had come 
close to the end.200 Esack’s response to his friends who questioned Esack’s absence from the 
political scene during South Africa’s transition to democracy was acidulous: “I have the right to 
say that I am not going to play my religion in the service of any kind of politics.”201 Esack was 
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critical of the increasing integration of progressive Muslims with party politics. What he was 
concerned about most was the retreat of progressive Islam from the streets and community 
spaces into the ranks of political parties and academic institutions. That would disjoin their 
liberative theology from ordinary people and transform it into a “middle-class discourse.”202 
Ironically, however, Esack himself was part of the same trend, as he had been busy with 
intellectual work far away from the country. The only excuse for his retreat could be his efforts 
to develop a comprehensive theology of liberation that would introduce a “new and inclusivist 
sense of morality forged within a struggle for human rights.”203 Being aware of the reasons 
making progressive Muslim discourse less popular and less influential, Esack’s main goal was to 
formulate a pluralist and liberative theology that would go beyond the confines of the apartheid 
context and address a wide variety of contexts of injustice and oppression. His critical 
engagement with Islamist thought and his confident and open-minded dialogue with non-Islamic 
theologies and ideologies would be the most valuable assets to his intellectual efforts. 
A Liberative and Pluralist Theology: Molding Islamist Thought with Political Praxis 
Farid Esack published an article in 1991 in which he developed some key hermeneutical 
concepts that would constitute the backbone of his conception of Islamic liberation theology.204 
There he promisingly noted that Cape Town, the center of the Islamist anti-apartheid 
mobilization in the 1980s, had been witnessing “the emergence of serious re-interpretative 
Islamic legal and social thought” and reached the conclusion that “praxis, evidently, is giving 
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birth to theory, or is, at least, nurturing it.”205 Esack’s own personal history was an important part 
of the mentioned intellectual dynamism and praxis in the South African Muslim community.206 
When Esack published, in 1997, his first academic book titled “Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism: 
An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression,” those re-interpretive 
efforts became concrete in a considerable form. The book, based on Esack’s PhD dissertation, 
presented a detailed proposal for a new radical theology for Muslims, which came out of his 
persistent “search for a South African qur’anic hermeneutics of pluralism for liberation.”207 
Esack’s departure point in constructing his theology was the idea that meaning 
production is always contextual. Contemporary hermeneutics revealed, according to Esack, that 
any interpretive effort is bounded by language, culture, and tradition. Furthermore, every 
interpreter necessarily brings a “baggage of race, class, gender, and personal history,” among 
other things, into the way she makes meaning of a text.208 Interpreting the Qur’an is no 
exception. Esack maintained that there is no way of providing an “objective” and “neutral” 
interpretation of the Qur’anic text. It is therefore necessary for any interpreter to point out the 
context in which she engages with the Qur’an. That is why Esack underlined, first of all, the 
South African context that informed his reading and he explained in detail the anti-apartheid 
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struggle of which he partook.209 Esack’s specific focus on “context” took place against the 
backdrop of the traditional Qur’anic exegesis that dealt substantially with the text itself, and, 
most of the time, at the expense of ignoring the context. Yet, Esack was cautious in 
acknowledging the universal message of the Qur’an, which, he argued, can be “recognized in the 
middle of an ongoing struggle to rediscover meaning in it.”210 He also pointed out that the 
Qur’an “is also an integrated whole with a definite ethos” and, thus, has definitely “something to 
say” to the context.211 Therefore, one of his main objectives was to prove that “it is possible to 
live in faithfulness to both the Qur’an and to one’s present context.”212 
Esack was particularly interested in the sociopolitical function of religion in society. 
According to him, under oppressive conditions, religion plays two roles.213 Either it becomes a 
tool for oppression through “accommodation theology,” which actively collaborates with forces 
of oppression or passively buttresses their power by not challenging their legitimacy and 
preaching obedience and quietism to the believers. Or it becomes a tool for emancipation 
through “liberation theology,” which calls for active struggle against oppressive forces and 
considers challenging unjust authorities and eliminating injustices as part of true faith.214 Esack 
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argued that, in the apartheid era, both theologies manifested themselves within Muslim 
communities as well as other religious communities in South Africa. For example, the famous 
Kairos Document published by a group of anti-apartheid clergymen in Soweto in 1985 urged 
South African Christians to build a “prophetic theology” that would fight the oppression and 
injustices in society, which had been persistently justified by “State Theology” and ignored by 
“Church Theology.”215 Similarly, Esack, with his belief in the role Muslims should play in 
liberating South Africans from the unjust apartheid regime, was very critical of the conservative 
Muslim clergy for their conformist and “apolitical” stance during the anti-apartheid struggle.216 
He believed that the majority of the South African Muslim community had adopted, what he 
called, “accommodation theology,” and this was one of the main reasons for Esack’s insistence 
on theorizing as well as practicing a liberative understanding of Islam. 
One of the terms Esack put at the center of his liberation theology was “praxis,” a term he 
borrowed from Christian liberation theologians.217 He argued that one cannot theorize liberation 
theology without practicing it. In other words, it is not possible to confine liberation theology to 
the realm of ideas and produce it within isolated intellectual circles or elite academic institutions. 
 
215 “The South Africa Kairos Document 1985,” Kairos Southern Africa website, posted May 8, 2011, 
https://kairossouthernafrica.wordpress.com/2011/05/08/the-south-africa-kairos-document-1985/. See also 
Bonganjalo Goba, “The Kairos Document and Its Implications for Liberation in South Africa,” Journal of Law and 
Religion 5, no. 2 (1987): 313-25. 
 
216 Against the major conservative argument that Muslims had enjoyed freedom of religion in South Africa, Esack 
was reproachfully asking: “Does Allah want us to pray in front of Him and then turn a blind eye to the suffering of 
others around us just because we were allowed to pray?” His answer was a sharp “no”: “Muslims are commanded to 
oppose oppression and to speak the truth in the face of tyrants”: Esack, But Musa Went to Firaun, 9 and 16. 
 
217 Esack referenced Rebecca Chopp in his book Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism but it was a widely used term in 
various works of liberation theologians including Gustavo Gutierrez’s groundbreaking work: Gutierrez, A Theology 
of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988), 5-10. Christian liberation theologians had borrowed the term 
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theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, ed. by Christopher Rowland (Cambridge: 
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It must start with acknowledging the realities of ordinary people facing various kinds of injustice 
and inequality on a daily basis and joining them in their struggle for justice. Then comes the 
“theological reflection that emerges from it and the reshaping of praxis based on that 
reflection.”218 This praxis-based theology, “orthopraxis” in Esack’s terms, is in stark contrast to 
traditional theologies, which require having true belief before proper conduct. The main problem 
with traditional theologies, Esack maintained, is that their doctrines are the “results of 
intellectual labor that has often endured for centuries” and “have consistently become 
increasingly rigid in a process that followed the systemization of theology.”219 They are, 
therefore, not always able to address the needs of Muslim communities emerging in particular 
historical contexts. Furthermore, in many instances, traditional theologies themselves come to 
prevent the believers from producing religious meaning pertaining to their urgent needs because 
of “untouchable” religious doctrines. Orthopraxis, however, underlines the changing and 
dynamic nature of the (re)production of religious meaning and sees religious practice as a natural 
component of that process. 
As Rahemtulla pointed out, the crucial place of the context and the restored agency of the 
laity in interpreting the Qur’an revealed some significant parallels between Islamist thought and 
Islamic liberation theology.220 For example, the prominent Islamist figures Sayyid Qutb and 
Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi both asserted that each individual Muslim had to address herself to the 
message of the Qur’an without an intermediary since the “Qur’an spoke directly to the believers, 
addressing their immediate circumstances and struggles.” In South Africa, the Arabic Study 
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Circle was the precursor to the proliferation of Islamist study circles by the 1970s.221 It was 
founded in Durban in 1950 with the aim of teaching Arabic to ordinary Muslims so that they 
could be able to read the original text of the Qur’an without leaning on the expertise of the 
Muslim clergy. That was the main reason for the harsh criticism they had faced from the 
traditional ulama. The MYM, who followed the Islamist tradition represented by Qutb and 
Mawdudi, and then the Call took it as a model and organized circles (halaqat) in which their 
members got the opportunity to discuss and reflect on a translation of the Qur’an alongside other 
texts in light of their own experiences.222 Those circles laid the groundwork for Islamic liberation 
theology in South Africa by enabling ordinary Muslims to merge their religious world view with 
the anti-apartheid struggle.223 
 “I believe that the Transcendent, God,” said Esack, “has intervened and is intervening in 
history.”224 At the core of this intervention, he argued, lies religious praxis, the ceaseless efforts 
of believers to understand and live their religion. Among those efforts, those of a certain group 
have a privileged place in Islam, according to Esack. It is the mustad’afun, “people of ‘inferior’ 
social status who are vulnerable, marginalized or oppressed in the socio-economic sense.”225 
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Esack noted that progressive Islamists adopted the notion as a result of their engagement with the 
revolutionary tradition in Iran, particularly Ali Shariati’s thought and the political ideology of the 
Mojahedin-e Khalq, an Islamo-Marxist revolutionary organization.226 The pro-mustad’afun 
discourse was premised on the idea that the Qur’an was clearly on the side of the mustad’afun 
against the oppressors (mustakbirun) and the former would become the agent of sociopolitical 
transformation with God’s help.227 What liberation theology had to prioritize in interpreting the 
Qur’anic scripture, therefore, was to empower those people and support their struggle for 
liberation. The “preferential option for the oppressed,” Esack pointed out, “is reflected in the 
particularized identification of God Himself with the oppressed, the lifestyles and methodology 
of all the Abrahamic prophets, the qur’anic denunciation of the powerful and accumulation of 
wealth, and the Qur’an’s message of liberation to women and slaves.”228 
What is more important for a liberative view of Islam is the Qur’an’s “unconditional” 
support for the liberation of the mustad’afun. Esack argued that, according to the Qur’an, 
whether the oppressed person is Muslim or not does not matter because all human beings have 
the right to be free from all kinds of restraint and oppression. As creatures of God, their lives and 
freedom are intrinsically and equally valuable. Freedom from oppression is also necessary for 
human beings to be able to “worship God freely.”229 Any form of hegemonic or oppressive 
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relations between people has the potential to put barriers between human beings and God in a 
way that the former could not be in submission only to the latter. In this regard, Esack put 
forward that liberation theology should work towards, above all, “freeing religion from social, 
political and religious structures and ideas based on uncritical obedience and the freedom of all 
people from all forms of injustice and exploitation including those of race, gender, class and 
religion.”230 The concept of tawhid and the story of the Exodus were very critical in helping 
Esack reach that conclusion.  
As Esack pointed out, the notion of tawhid became popular among anti-apartheid 
Islamists of the 1980s through the works of Ali Shariati.231 According to Shariati, tawhid was a 
“worldview aimed at realizing the unity of God in human relations and socio-economic 
systems.” One major implication of that conception in Islamist thought in South Africa would be 
the rejection of all social, political, and economic inequalities, racial division in the first place. 
Since the Qur’an did not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity, the very nature of the 
apartheid regime was considered by Islamists as the “antithesis of tawhid.” According to Esack, 
tawhid also implies the “Qur’anic objective of an egalitarian social order” and, thus, necessitates 
struggling for socioeconomic justice as the prophetic tradition demonstrated clearly with its 
solidarity with the marginalized and downtrodden.232 In that regard, tawhid, originally an 
Islamist notion, became one of the fundamental pillars of Islamic liberation theology.233 
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 The story of the Exodus added another dimension to a liberative and pluralist conception 
of Islamic theology. A radical interpretation of the Exodus was, in fact, the hallmark of Christian 
liberation theology.234 Many liberation theologians saw the liberation from slavery of the 
Israelites living in the ancient Egypt as a clear sign for God’s indisputable support for the 
oppressed. They maintained that the “liberating intervention of God” through the leadership of 
Moses made the Exodus more than a historical fact or a biblical story.235 It was actually a 
paradigm which transcended history and revealed how religious and political dimensions of faith 
had converged at the theme of liberation.236 Worked on how the story was told in the Qur’an, 
Esack would embrace the Exodus paradigm with its major sociopolitical implications.237 
Moreover, Esack argued that the way South African Islamists had used the Exodus paradigm was 
unique for its emphasis on solidarity with the “marginalized and oppressed religious Other.”238 
According to Esack, until the elimination of oppressive conditions, Prophet Moses was 
responsible for leading the Israelites’ struggle for liberation rather than preaching religious truths 
to them. “Neither God, nor Moses,” underlined Esack, “abandoned the Israelites before they 
 
Islamic theology is that it not only weds the struggle for justice to the single most important tenet in Islam, but also 
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reached the Promised Land despite their recalcitrance in kufr.”239 In other words, acting in 
solidarity with the religious Other was not only allowed but also encouraged in the Qur’an. This 
is the point where liberation and pluralism would weave into each other in Esack’s conception of 
liberation theology. 
The issue of the religious Other was the main question Esack dealt with in his studies of 
the relationship between Islam and liberation. This was because the major conflict within the 
South African Muslim community over the role of Islam in the anti-apartheid struggle was about 
the matter of cooperation with non-Muslim people and non-Islamic movements. Esack argued 
that the traditional teachings that had become influential in shaping Islamic theologies for 
centuries caused religious exclusivism on the part of Muslim communities.240 Islamist thought 
was no exception in that regard.241 Despite their religiously untraditional and politically anti-
apartheid approach, many South African Islamists did not see the religious Other as a legitimate 
partner in the struggle and rejected engaging with any ideas rooted in non-Islamic theologies or 
secular ideologies.  However, according to Esack, not only interfaith solidarity was possible as 
demonstrated by the Qur’anic paradigm of the Exodus, but also the “acceptance of the righteous 
and just Other,” he contended, was “intrinsic to the Qur’an.”242 He thus attempted to revive the 
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pluralist nature of the Qur’an by revisiting the qur’anic categories of belief/believer and 
disbelief/disbeliever. 
Esack’s main argument was that, despite their dynamic and changing nature, the 
categories of belief/believer and disbelief/disbeliever had become “reified” and “rigid” in the 
traditional accounts of the Qur’an.243 This led people to consider the believer and the disbeliever 
as having mutually exclusive and fixed identities. It also resulted in the use of these categories 
incorrectly as “the entrenched qualities of groups, bordering on ethnic characteristics.”244 As a 
result, Muslims considered communities of non-Muslims, in many cases, as the social other or 
the political enemy with which there was no way to cooperate. However, Esack maintained, 
belief and disbelief are essentially personal attributes and, except a particular kind of disbelief 
that is openly and actively hostile to Muslims, there is no obstacle to having dialogue, 
cooperating and struggling together with non-Muslims.245 On the contrary, the Qur’an puts 
emphasis on the unity of humankind (tawhid) and encourages believers to be caring and attentive 
to the needs of others, regardless of religious, ethnic or any other sort of identity.246 Furthermore, 
it acknowledges the good deeds of non-believers and does not exclude the possibility that the 
truth could be felt, discovered and lived out by people who do not believe in Islam. In this 
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regard, Esack pointed out, Islam is not only open to theological pluralism as well as social and 
political pluralism.247 
After having situated on what terms, against what, and with whom a struggle for justice 
and liberation should be waged in Esack’s religiopolitical thought, it is necessary to answer the 
question of what one should fight for. It is no doubt that Esack’s conception of Islamic liberation 
theology was radical in the sense that it aimed at the elimination of established structures of 
injustice and oppression. Just like Christian liberation theologians who rejected “reformist 
capitalist development” and called for an end to the exploitative economic system, South African 
progressive Islamists had never welcomed any reformist attempt by the apartheid state and 
persistently struggled to eradicate the racist regime.248 In both theologies of liberation, the main 
goal was to get rid of all “systemic evils” and “structural sins” so that human beings would be 
free from any chains. Esack’s opinion that “you cannot truly submit to God when you are under 
the yoke of hunger” pointed out the same concern that the leading liberation theologian Gustavo 
Gutiérrez had addressed: “How to proclaim God as Father in an inhuman world? How do we tell 
the ‘non-persons’ that they are the sons and daughters of God?”249 While Gutiérrez was 
underscoring that the liberation of Latin America “also means seeing that humanity is marching 
toward a society in which man will be free of every servitude and master of his own destiny,” 
Esack was stressing Prophet Muhammad’s struggle “for the creation of a world wherein it is safe 
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to be human and where people are freed from enslavement to man in order to worship God 
freely.”250 In a word, their theologies were not only critical, but also revolutionary.  
In apartheid South Africa, the goal of the revolutionaries was clear: “the creation of a 
non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and just South Africa.”251 Esack had agreed to that ideal since 
what he had struggled for was a political system that would ensure a pluralist society defined by 
freedom for everybody.252 Esack was quite critical of the idea of an Islamic state, on the other 
hand, since he thought that it would harm the idea of pluralism. Being a member of a religious 
minority was certainly an advantage in that regard, according to Esack: ““Minorities,” often 
privileged to be free from Muslim governments, have a particularly significant contribution to 
make the discourse of cultural pluralism and diversity.”253 But what about after the revolution? 
When the transition to post-apartheid regime started in the early 1990s and, finally, a democratic 
regime was established in 1994, Esack had come to understand better that the struggle for justice 
would never come to an end. Losing many of his friends to the realpolitik and witnessing the 
erosion of the ideals by the very hands of the people who had fought for a few years earlier, 
Esack’s major emphasis would be on “process” from then on. After almost two decades and a 
half he wrote his dissertation on Islamic liberation theology, the most explicit conclusion he has 
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arrived at was as follows: “I do not think that there is ever a point that we say “we have arrived.” 
I think liberation theology is about the process. It is about the permanent process.”254 
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 CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: LIBERATION THEOLOGY BEYOND APARTHEID 
 
In his 1986 speech, which is mentioned in the Introduction, Esack had drawn attention to 
the “ghettoized” political perceptions of anti-apartheid organizations and urged them “to 
proclaim the oneness of humankind and to focus on universal concerns” such as global 
capitalism, the oppression of women, and the challenges of interfaith dialogue.255 Esack’s 
emphasis on “universality” may come as surprise at first glance given his persistent search for a 
“South African” Islamism in the face of the rising influence of transnational Islamist trends since 
the late 1970s. However, when examined closely, it becomes clear that both his critique of 
transnational Islamism and his call for universal awareness were informed by the very same idea: 
the oneness of humankind. While he was encouraging his fellow Muslims to acknowledge the 
humanity of the non-Muslim other during the anti-apartheid struggle, he was equally concerned 
about his non-Muslim comrades who had overlooked the injustices other than the oppression of 
those termed “non-white” in South Africa.  
Esack himself devoted most of his academic studies to interfaith solidarity in the first half 
of the 1990s and made pluralism (both in political and theological sense) the backbone of his 
conception of Islamic liberation theology. Gender injustices also would be one of the 
fundamental issues that preoccupied Esack’s post-apartheid theology and activism. Esack played  
a crucial role in bringing in the issue of gender inequality to the attention of the South African 
Muslim community during the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic feminism had emerged under the 
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leadership of Muslim women’s rights activists such as Shamima Sheikh (1960-1998) as the 
debates around gender equality became intensified among South African progressive Muslims in 
the early 1990s.256 Esack closely cooperated with Sheikh and others in challenging the 
patriarchal culture dominating both the religious hierarchy and the everyday life.257  
One single event that was of great symbolic significance for the South African “gender 
jihad” was the controversial Friday khutbah, sermon, given by the eminent American scholar 
Amina Wadud in Cape Town in 1994.258 Wadud’s khutbah sparked a lot of controversies among 
Muslims in and outside South Africa for women had been traditionally not “allowed” to address 
mixed congregations. Esack, who had supported the organization of the khutbah, was 
considering “women officiating in all worship ceremonies in mosques as an intrinsic part of 
human rights and gender equality.”259 Soon after he came back from Europe, in 1997, Esack was 
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appointed by the then president Nelson Mandela as a Commissioner for Gender Equality.260 He 
was now a bureaucrat working for the government, cornered by the realpolitik he had been 
complaining about for the last couple of years.261 In June 2000, he co-founded Positive Muslims, 
a South African organization supporting HIV-positive Muslims and raising awareness about 
HIV/AIDS among Muslims.262 In the following two decades, he also wrote extensively on issues 
such as gender, feminism, and sexual diversity and ethics, with reference to Qur’anic 
hermeneutics and contemporary political discussions.263  
Since the 1990s, Esack also started to be involved in transnational networks of Muslim 
scholars and activists such as the Network of Progressive Muslims (NPM).264 In the post-9/11 
context, he became much more preoccupied with inequalities in global politics caused by 
imperialism and neocolonialism. Esack was particularly critical of the popularized dialectic of 
the “good Muslim” who was moderate and peaceful and the “bad Muslim” who was radical and 
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violent. Denouncing that dialectic, which, he argued, had been internalized by most liberal 
progressive Muslims, Esack had positioned himself in the anti-imperialist progressive camp who 
opposed the US-led Islamic reform project and criticized the discourse of peace that did not 
challenge the unjust world order.265 In line with that, beginning from the early 2010s, Esack has 
incorporated some elements of decolonial thinking into his conceptualization of Islamic 
liberation theology.266 In the same period, alongside his continuous intellectual efforts and 
academic posts in different universities, he maintained his activism, this time by partaking in a 
global solidarity movement of Palestinian rights inspired by the South African anti-apartheid 
struggle: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS).267  
Farid Esack’s life story shows all the intellectual entanglements and political contexts 
that led to him formulating an original and influential form of Islamic liberation theology. From 
his early politicization within the Black Consciousness Movement in the early 1970s to his years 
of BDS activism during the 2010s, he prioritized a struggle that sided with the marginalized. 
Beginning in his Pakistan years, he strove for a harmony between his religious faith and political 
thinking and for a balance between his practice and theology. His involvement in South African 
anti-apartheid Islamism of the 1980s paved the way for him to construct a comprehensive 
theology that was liberative and pluralist during his academic research in Europe in the 1990s. 
Esack’s experiences combined anti-racist currents of thought not only in the context of anti-
 
265 According to Esack, there had emerged a sharped disagreement among progressive Muslims about the definition 
of the term “Progressive Islam.” See Farid Esack, “Progressive Islam – A Rose by Any Name? American Soft 
Power in the War for the Hearts and Minds of Muslims,” ReOrient 4, no. 1 (Autumn, 2018): 78-106. For an earlier 
discussion of the term, see Farid Esack, “In Search of Progressive Islam Beyond 9/11,” in Progressive Muslims: On 
Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003); 78-97. 
 
266 See, for example, Farid Esack and Ashraf Kunnummal, “Malala Yousafzai and the Post-9/11 Politics of Gender 
and Governmentality,” Journal of Gender and Religion in Africa 21, no. 1 (July 2015): 49-70. 
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apartheid ideologies such as African humanism and socialism but also from the context of South 
Asian and South East Asian struggles against colonial forms of racialization towards Muslims 
and Hindus.268  
His deep engagement with Islamist thought was also crucial in the formation of his 
religiopolitical ideas. Esack inherited both the imperial era Pan-Islamic currents of thought and 
the cold war era Islamism, while critically and creatively reflecting on them in conversation with 
Christian liberation theology and anti-apartheid movement. More importantly, he prioritized 
praxis and activism for emancipation and equality, and solidarity with the oppressed in his 
hermeneutic engagement with Muslim religious texts. “Questions of privileges and marginalities 
and how the Qur’an speaks to it,” in Esack’s own words, were always at the heart of his 
theological thinking. He also paid attention to race, class and gender equality in intersectional 
methodology. Last but not least, Esack kept engagement with non-Western intellectual circles 
and spheres from South Asia to the Middle East, while being active in publication and lecture 
circuits of progressive European and North American academia. 
Esack’s positionality in South African anti-apartheid struggle as a member of the Muslim 
minority helped him counter the state-centered and nationalism-focused conservative turn in 
global Muslim thought that took place in the late cold war era. In other words, Islamic liberation 
theology, as conceptualized by Esack, had gone against the tide of the rising identity-based and 
 
268 For a comprehensive analysis of a late 19th-century transnational network of Indian, Australian and South 
African Muslims, see Eric Germain, “Southern Hemisphere Diasporic Communities in the Building of an 
International Muslim Public Opinion at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 1 (2007): 126-138. It is also important to note here that the answer to the question 
of why a social justice-oriented and pluralist Muslim theology emerged in South Africa may lie in the fact that the 
transnational networks of South African anti-colonial, anti-racist, leftist, and Christian liberationist intellectuals and 
activists were very powerful and, therefore, there was a quite dynamic and vibrant atmosphere shaped around the 
anti-apartheid movement. See, for example, Susan Pennybacker, ““Fire by Night, Cloud by Day”: Exile and Refuge 
in Postwar London,” Journal of British Studies 59, no. 1 (January 2020): 1-31 and Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: 
Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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parochial Muslim politics of the late 1970s onward. Esack’s liberative theology thus helps to 
uncover the often-ignored diversity of Muslim political thought of the period. As one of the 
many forms that the relationship between Islam and politics could take, Islamic liberation 
theology was centered on the belief in the oneness of humankind, the idea of liberation and 
pluralism, social justice and interfaith solidarity. More importantly, it developed out of a 
liberation struggle of the oppressed and was shaped around practice more than theory.  
Yet, Islamic liberation theology was not completely detached from the mainstream 
currents, particularly transnational Islamism of the time. From the notion of Islam as a 
comprehensive way of life to the search for social and political principles in the Qur’an, Esack 
incorporated some basic Islamist teachings and principles into his concept of liberation theology. 
More importantly, with the focus on racial equality and solidarity with the marginalized, it 
becomes clear that Esack’s major ideas are in harmony with anti-colonial pan-Islamic thinkers 
like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Barkatullah and Third Worldist Muslim 
intellectuals such as Ali Shariati. In other words, despite the arguments that attempt to picture 
Islamism and liberation theology as incompatible modes of thinking, there are significant 
continuities between the emancipatory Muslim thought of the pre-1980s and Islamic liberation 
theology. I believe this connection is particularly important towards the effort of unearthing the 
traces and the historical stages of an emancipatory and social justice-based tradition within 
contemporary Muslim political thought, starting from the pan-Islamism of the late 19th century 
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